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Issues of the 1968 election are discussed here in seven articles. The first article points out that most of the poverty families in this country have working heads and shows "the patent fact that there are many workers who cannot earn enough to sustain themselves and their families."

American Poverty: Rural and Urban

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THE DISCOVERY OF poverty amidst affluence is a recent phenomenon—only four years old. Not that poor people were unknown prior to President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, initiated in 1964, but few politicians became excited over the issue. In the United States, the comfortable middle class attributed poverty to indolence or a lack of moral sense and, more frequently than not, simply shrugged its shoulders, sighing that little could be done about the slothful character of the poor.

The Great Depression added millions to the rolls of the poor and, despite all the energetic motion of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, not much could be done to lessen the pain of unemployment and poverty until World War II. It was only then that an economy unable to solve its problems with market principles discovered that massive state intervention was needed to restore prosperity. After the war, even as the United States moved to higher and higher levels of

economic activity, many deluded themselves—driving along freshly built turnpikes in new automobiles—that there were no more poor Americans. But the sprawling suburbias had merely pushed the poor back into the hills or left them stranded in city ghettos.

A few writers, however, insisted that all was not well with the body politic.¹ Gabriel Kolko demonstrated that income statistics had failed to say all there was to say about the poor; Michael Harrington evoked the quality of being poor; James Morgan and his team of Michigan social scientists provided a mountain of data exposing the poverty syndrome; and when Dwight Macdonald summed it all up in a brilliant *New Yorker* article, the United States suddenly discovered a blight it wanted to forget.

What are the dimensions of this blight? The Council of Economic Advisers concluded in 1964 that one-fifth of the population of the United States was poor. Although 22 per cent of the poor were Negroes, they comprised nearly half the Negro population of the country. Negroes suffered from so low an education that it relegated them to the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder; moreover, they were subjected to a policy of discrimination that had kept them in a suppressed state for over 300 years.

¹ See, for example, Gabriel Kolko, *Wealth and Power in America* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Michael Harrington, *The Other America* (New York: Macmillan, 1962); James N. Morgan *et al*, *Income and Welfare in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963); Dwight Macdonald, "Our Invisible Poor," *The New Yorker*, January 19, 1963.

Nevertheless, the C.E.A. yardstick, which had been based on an income cut-off line of \$3,000 per annum, was considered by many as too conservative and too crude, for it failed to take account of family size, age of the family head, or geography. It was argued that a single poverty base distorted the analysis of poverty, overstating it for some groups and underestimating it for others. Rather, ran the argument, one ought to specify a band of poverty: who is to say that a family with an income of \$3,010 is not as poor as one with an income of \$2,990? Most authorities now accept the approach used by Mollie Orshansky of the Social Security Administration, who in 1965 took into account food needs, size of family, geographic location and similar elements. She concluded that a poverty income would range from \$1,580 for a single person in urban areas to \$5,090 for a family of eight, with a pivot of \$3,130 for a family of four. Today the upper limit comes close to \$7,000. Applying such statistical measures, one discovers the astounding fact that a prosperous America harbors approximately 30 million poor people, or some 9 million families.

Once we have made this count, we suddenly find that most of the heads of these families are working. The rate of unemployment is low—just under four per cent of the work force, or about three million. Roughly two-thirds of the poverty problem stems from the patent fact that there are many workers who cannot earn enough to sustain themselves and their families. They are displaced coal miners now tending bar or working in small groceries; they are former meat packers happy to be employed as janitors; they are small farmers, the last of America's yeomanry; they are poorly paid dishwashers whose earnings must be supplemented by public assistance—to which one could add the Negroes at work, if at all, in only the poorest paying jobs, the aged, stored away in institutions and rooming houses to die, the uncomplaining residents of the hollows of Appalachia, the Mexican-Americans of the Southwest, and the poorest of the poor, the American Indians clustered on arid tracts of land known as reservations.

THE NEGRO POOR

Let us consider some of these groups, for poverty remains a mere statistic unless viewed as the experience of real people. The Negro is the most visible of the poor, not only because his skin is black, but because he has been compressed into the ghettos of the cities where periodically he breaks out in riots of frustration and anger. The modern ghetto is a Northern invention to keep the Negro apart from the rest of society: almost half the Negroes in the North live in these vermin-infested enclaves. An analysis of the relevant statistics reveals that the Negro has three times as many chances as the white person to find himself in poverty.

Even if he has the same education and occupation as the white person, the Negro does not do as well: the college educated Negro earns on the average only 47 per cent of what his white colleague receives. Nor can he buy the same foods and services as the white person with the same income. A 1966 Bureau of Labor Statistics study revealed wide discrepancies between what the poor pay for food and what others pay. The Negro's dollar buys inferior housing because there is a smaller supply from which he can choose. And he suffers higher rates of unemployment: at about 10 per cent, ghetto unemployment rates run three times the national average. Were these unemployment rates in 1966 equal to that for whites, the Gross National Product (GNP) would be at least \$5 billion greater. If education and training for Negroes had been equal to that of the rest of the community, GNP would have been another \$20 billion greater. This has been the cost of discrimination and poverty.

THE ELDERLY POOR

There are other groups in our society that are just as poor, if not more so. Families headed by older persons comprise one-third of all poor families, a ratio that is substantially higher than the one in seven for the total number of aged in the general population. Were it not for Social Security, many aged poor would suffer outright starvation. For many, retirement benefits, niggardly as they

are, keep the family income above the poverty line. Yet with all the improvements in recent years, the average monthly benefit is only about \$84, about \$20 a week for four out of five families with an aged head.

Such treatment reflects what we really think of our aged: they may be among us, but they are not part of us. Like many other societies, the United States simply discards the aged, stuffing them into institutions and boarding houses to let them await death slowly. Americans pay obeisance to social conscience, for in our institutions the aged are given care of a sort, but it is usually of the same order as might be accorded to an inanimate object. Institutions for the aged are apt to be tombs for the living and, as in a tomb, absolute silence prevails. When the inmate is poor, relying on small Social Security payments, as is the lot of many, apathy and sustained depression are the results. As the inmate loses all hope of a life with some sense of dignity, persons of sound mind and body can withdraw without qualms of conscience. The sense of doom suffered by the resident of an institution for the aged hastens his passage through the long vestibule to death.

If the aged owned or controlled property on which younger persons depended, if they were transmitters of culture holding important blocs of knowledge, if the extended family were still central in American society, if Americans were tradition-oriented, or if the aged could produce goods and services that were in any way economically useful, then they might still be honored. But none of this is true and so Americans prefer to keep them out of sight and out of mind.

The aged have little in the way of accumulated savings. Some may have homes with mortgages fully paid, some insurance, and some liquid assets, but in 1960, 30 per cent of families with heads over the age of 65 had no liquid assets, and 20 per cent had such assets amounting to less than \$1,000. More than half the equities in homes were worth less than \$10,000. Such assets are not available for the usual emergencies that afflict the aged.

Such emergencies frequently stem from poor health, and meeting their costs constitutes a major problem for the aged. So serious has this situation been that over the past two decades there was a rising demand for a public health insurance program that was finally met, at least partially, through Medicare. As passed in 1965, Medicare fell short of the original proposals, but it was still a significant advance. Its impact will in all probability go far beyond the 10 per cent of the population for whom it was devised: other health insurance schemes will no doubt be affected in some significant degree.

Part of the Social Security system, Medicare offers a hospitalization service, post-hospital care and diagnostic services. Dire predictions were made that established medical services would be disrupted, yet by the end of 1966 there were nearly 19 million persons over 65 enrolled in Medicare without the massive disorder its critics foresaw. The aged were finally in a position to obtain medical care despite rising hospital costs and doctors' fees.

THE YOUTHFUL POOR

At the other end of the age spectrum are the youth of the cities, large numbers of whom are also trapped in poverty, often second and third generation victims of an unbreakable circle of deprivation. They cannot rely on the school to help them escape, for as the educational system currently functions it does little to raise the hopes and aspirations of the poor. Slum children, particularly, do poorly in school because they are expected to perform poorly. While the first-grade child in a slum school comes with as much motivation as a middle-class child, he is soon alienated by an apparatus that tends to freeze him into a lower-class style of life. The street and the school support each other to create attitudes that keep youth in slums and eventually in poverty.

A poor education is apt to yield a low income for the rest of one's life. In 1957, a college education for the family head meant an average family income of \$8,100: today the latter figure is substantially higher. But

where the education of the family head was six years or less, the average income in 1957 was \$4,700. Vocational education, as presently conducted, does not provide an effective channel for the move out of poverty. In many systems, the vocational school is simply a dumping place. In fact, the entire educational establishment is out of balance, for it is geared to the 20 or 30 per cent who go on to college. Most are pushed out of school: 35 per cent of all students fail to complete high school, and 45 per cent of high school students are "lost" in the sense that they wind up in dead-end jobs.

With such "preparation," it comes as no surprise to find that the youth unemployment level is three times the nation's overall unemployment rate. The real dilemma created by the promise of an affluent society is that poor youth may be satisfied with life on the street, compared with low-paying jobs that have no future. In this case, we declare such youth to be unemployable.

To be sure, the War on Poverty has given particular attention to youth. Its Project Head Start sought to reach some 560,000 poor children before they entered a school system for which they were ill-prepared. The Neighborhood Youth Corps, essentially a caretaker project, did try to provide some medical and dental care. But these programs soon began to founder: in Head Start's second year there was a catastrophic drop in enrollment to about 56,000 youngsters. Moreover the effort was bound to fail when no follow-up was offered, for after a promising beginning the child was placed in the same old school environment that simply destroyed whatever good Head Start had achieved.

Nor was it possible to assert that the Job Corps had been a resounding success, despite all the Office of Economic Opportunity's handouts proclaiming its accomplishments. Derived from the New Deal's Civilian Conservation Corps, the Job Corps installations sought to make their enrollees "employable." The camps for men, about half of which were operated by private firms, combined the features of an army post and a boarding school; to many they seemed to offer para-

military training as a way of preparing youth for an urban life. In the Job Corps centers operated by corporations on a cost-plus-fee basis the youths were called "trainees"; in those run by universities they were called "students." The distinction in emphasis was clear. In one case, the cost-plus calculations yielded a profit of \$600,000—well earned, no doubt—for applying "systems analysis" to the personalities of poor children. By 1966, the Job Corps was the "sick man" of the War on Poverty and, with the budgetary difficulties engendered by the other war in Vietnam, the number of centers was being reduced drastically.

THE RURAL POOR

But these are the poor of the city, where riots in the long hot summers may give vent to the desperation and humiliation of the ghetto. Residents of Appalachia and other rural regions are less apt to express their frustrations in such violent ways. Yet their poverty is perhaps even more deeply rooted than that of the cities. One study of a mountain area revealed average family cash income of less than \$1,000. Rural poverty is a problem that affects Mississippi, Arkansas and Northern Wisconsin, as well as the 11-state mountain strip known as Appalachia. The poor in the hollows of the mountains are not reached by new federal programs; public assistance in Appalachia costs about \$500 million a year. The same conditions may be found in Arkansas, where once farmers grew alfalfa or raised beef cattle. In some counties, as many as one-third of the citizenry are on welfare. Or one may travel to the north woods of Michigan, plundered of its timber, facing depletion of its iron ore, and now sinking into poverty. By every economic indication, the northern parts of Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota are being converted into another Appalachia.

Rural poverty in these places affects mainly whites. But there are other rural poor—Mexican-Americans and Indians—whose agony is even more painful. Some four million persons of Mexican ancestry are gathered in the Southwest and West. After the Ne-

groes, they are the nation's second largest disadvantaged minority. Handicapped by a lack of job skills, inadequate schooling and language problems, they have been largely ignored in the recent War on Poverty. They lag behind Negroes in years of schooling and suffer from similar kinds of discrimination. Some small efforts have been made to conduct projects on their behalf, as in Laredo, Texas, but these were merely "demonstrations."

And the American Indians, hidden in the obscure corners of 25 states, are the poorest of the poor. Numbering about 400,000, the Indians live in or near federal reservations in utter squalor. The climate is often difficult; the reservation is far from markets and resources; and the Indians have few skills suitable for an industrial society. Several O.E.O. projects funded to help the Indians have made little dent in their poverty conditions.

Still another outcast is the migratory agricultural worker who moves with the seasons to harvest crops in California, upstate New York and New England. All that awaits him at the end of the growing season are the same grim shanties and the tar paper shacks that greeted him the year before. In some states there has been some improvement in the condition of migratory workers stemming from union activity and legislative action, but it has been negligible. The migratory worker is in the backwoods of America, where the affluent do not see him.

Any programs set up to deal with rural poverty are uncoordinated, bureaucratized and piecemeal. An example is the Appalachian Regional Development Act passed with great hope in 1965. It provided \$840 million for highways and \$240 million for health centers, sewage facilities, vocational education and other "social overhead" needs. It was assumed that Appalachia's distress was caused by physical isolation and that roads would solve the problem. Yet effective redevelopment should have called for a reversal of the proportions, for the central problem stems from the decay of Appalachia's entire "social overhead" inheritance. Not until the

latter problems, so intimately related to questions of "human resources," are confronted in the region will Appalachian youth stop the trek to Northern cities, leaving behind the aged and the unemployable.

To deal with these deeply rooted problems, the Johnson Administration mounted its War on Poverty. Washington legend has it that the campaign began in the previous administration when White House assistant Theodore Sorensen showed President John F. Kennedy the remarkable *New Yorker* article on poverty by Dwight Macdonald. Kennedy did not require much to convince him of the political assets that a real antipoverty program could bring, for he had visited West Virginia during the primary campaigns of 1960. When Lyndon Johnson became chief executive it soon became evident that antipoverty was to be fashionable.

THE WAR ON POVERTY

There was to be a well-rounded attack on poverty, said administrators and legislators: tax cuts, civil rights legislation, regional development, urban rehabilitation, youth programs, vocational training and hospital insurance were to be part of the strategy. And a special office was to be created—the Office of Economic Opportunity—which would work to create for the poor a new environment. Yet at no time did the O.E.O. program reach as much as 15 per cent of the poor: one former deputy director admitted that in all probability the ratio had never exceeded 6 per cent or about 1.8 million persons. Through the years O.E.O. has demonstrated an inability to touch more than a few. For one thing, the task was simply beyond the limited resources that Congress had made available. Secondly, there were unstated political components in the War on Poverty that to all intents and purposes converted it into a war on the poor. For the program merely selected certain groups as objects of special aid, rather than providing services as a matter of right, and moreover it dispensed such aid in a manner that served to heighten the sense of satisfaction of those distributing the aid. The poor were merely to show gratitude.

Even before the Economic Opportunity Act had been passed, federal agencies were wrangling for the right to control the programs. The Department of Agriculture had a long laundry list of projects that ignored the urban poor; the Labor Department jealously guarded its manpower and training prerogatives; and Health, Education and Welfare—a monster department that could generate enormous motion going nowhere—insisted that everything be done through the states. O.E.O., in the meantime, was to act as a kind of coordinating agency, dispensing funds and hoping that something would be done. Its staff spent many hours devising names that would stress uplift and forward progress—Head Start, Upward Bound, VISTA, and Tender Loving Care. If they could have replaced the word “poverty” with an “upbeat” title they would have done so.

Paralleling the tensions at national levels was the political struggle in local communities. The legislation required that there be “maximum participation of the poor,” but no one quite knew what that implied. To local poor and to some civil rights groups, the legislative meaning was self-evident: the poor were to have a voice in their own destinies. But such an interpretation stuck in the throats of local politicians in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles—and especially in the South. Many mayors saw a splendid opportunity to shore up their political machines through patronage paid for by the federal government, and in the fantastic struggle that ensued they were the victors.

When rallies were held in Chicago to celebrate the progress of the War on Poverty, they were not very different from time honored block-rallies and ward meetings. In Boston, the director of the local “umbrella” anti-poverty agency, who was tied to the mayor’s office, had to be discharged for incompetence. The feud between the poor and the establishment in Cleveland paralleled Chicago’s squabble. Denver’s CAP program limped along, crippled by political infighting. In the meantime, those who were to be helped continued their miserable existence in the slums and ghettos of America.

Shall we allow poverty in America to harden into an ineradicable social syndrome? Shall we allow well intentioned efforts to be destroyed by the exigencies of national and local power politics? Can an affluent nation like ours continue to deny to the poor the joys of the cornucopia of plenty? If not, what is to be done? Only continued frustration will be the outcome unless we can mount a broad and adequately supported program (perhaps costing as much as \$30 billion). Such a program must cut across all the needs of the nation and of the poor, for the needs are virtually the same—decent cities, adequate transportation, proper education, jobs for the poor and sustenance for those unable to participate in the making of a decent society.

Perhaps this means a guaranteed annual income or a negative income tax or other form of income maintenance. In early 1964 a pronouncement was issued by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution—a group of educators, publicists, and economists—which urged among other things the adoption of a guaranteed income as a way of meeting the impact of the new technology.

The reaction was little short of amazing: everyone was opposed. One might have thought that the notion was merely another wild idea from a group of harebrained professors and assorted radicals. Although official Washington did not respond (the committee had sent its report to the White House), hundreds of newspaper editorials across the land raged against this audacious attack on the ingrained Puritan ethic of our time. A major debate is still going on.

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Analyzing the foreign policy problems which will face the new administration, this article emphasizes that "The Soviet Union has as much interest in its continued survival as we have in ours and . . . has as much to gain . . . from mutual security. This involves, for both, freeing resources and energies for domestic problems and reducing . . . troubles and dangers arising from the actions of other countries."

Major Problems of Foreign Policy

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THE INAUGURAL balls of January 20, 1969, will be well attended and the guests will dance as if they did not have a care in the world. After the balls are over, they will sleep without worry of a strategic thermonuclear attack, despite the fact that Soviet submarines are submerged a few hundred miles off our coasts with nuclear missiles targeted on our cities. These dancers and sleepers are not irresponsible in ignoring the nuclear threat. They are sure that the Soviet Union will not make a surprise strike on the United States as long as we are in a position to retaliate with a devastating counter-blow which would, in former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's phrase, end the existence of the Soviet Union "as a viable society."

The rulers in the Kremlin also sleep at night without fear of a surprise American nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. They are sure that enough of their missiles would survive a surprise United States attack on them to permit a retaliatory strike of at least 200 rockets, sufficient to destroy the United States.

Thus, for the two superpowers, there is deterrence and relative security from one another. But there are two adverse developments.

From 1962 to about 1966, when most long-range missiles were land-based, the United

States generally followed a "no-cities" target policy. That is, our missiles were targeted on enemy missile bases and military installations, in the hope that the Russians would do the same and that scores of millions of casualties would be avoided on both sides. This did have an adverse consequence, putting a nerve-wracking premium on making the first "preemptory" strike, since there would be no point in American missiles coming in on an enemy missile site after enemy missiles had taken off. But this disadvantage was never so bad as some "experts" believed, since there never was any real danger of either superpower making a first strike at the other. There still is no real likelihood of such a first strike, despite the horror stories spread by those who make a living from weapons sales or from professional anti-communism.

The second adverse consequence of mutual deterrence between the superpowers is of much more importance; in fact, international affairs on a world basis have been dominated by it. Because of their determination to avoid war with each other but to keep their basic enmity simmering for reasons of internal as well as external politics, the superpowers have encouraged third powers to be irresponsible. The United States has encouraged Nationalist China, the Soviet Union has encouraged the Arab states, and both have encouraged

insignificant parts of Vietnam, Korea, and Africa to make trouble. By reducing the superpowers' influence, *as powers*, on the international scene, this has led to the fragmentation of the world and to the irresponsibility of these fragments—a situation which has now almost totally bankrupted the United Nations, except as a forum where anyone can say anything and not be held responsible.

This neutralization of the two superpowers in international affairs is the consequence of two developments: the fear of escalation of any conflict between them, and the efforts by both sides to compensate for the resulting loss of power by overemphasizing their ideological and other differences in order to bind their wavering allies and satellites more closely to their sides. The neutralization of the superpowers' ability to resort to force encourages such drifting into neutralism. Here again, domestic politics exerts a bad influence, since both superpowers emphasize their antipathies for reasons of domestic political solidarity and for the private economic interests of groups and individuals who benefit from the domestic activities (such as armament expenditure, rapid military promotions, distortions of academic expenditures) arising from increased differences between the superpowers.

The neutralization and weakening of the superpowers in international affairs do not reduce but increase the danger of war, just as the weakening of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires increased the danger of war before 1914. In the present case, danger arises from the superpowers' unwillingness to use their strength even at a safe level (or on parallel paths) for fear that such actions might escalate into a collision between them on a nuclear level. This is clearly seen in the most critical areas of the world, Central Europe and the Near East.

The neutralization of the superpowers, with the resulting growth in independence and irresponsibility of lesser powers, is a dangerous development in international affairs, as long as the superpowers continue to nurse their mutual rivalries and enmities. Since no solution to the problem can be reached by

the world dominance of either of them, a solution must be reached by a reduction of Soviet-American enmity based on the recognition, at least tacitly, that disturbance in the Near East, South Asia, the Far East, or even in Africa, Latin America or Indonesia, is of no real benefit to either and is potentially very dangerous to both. The ways in which Cuba, Egypt, Communist China and other countries can use the Soviet-American enmity to extort concessions from either or to blackmail both by threats to do business with the other are damaging to both and advantageous to neither.

The background for Soviet-American recognition of the realities of this situation rests in their realization that they have urgent domestic problems and that they face growing internal discontent from failure to deal with these problems because of the obsession—especially on the American side—with foreign problems which are often unreal and insoluble. These domestic problems are different in the two societies; still neither society can deal with its domestic problems as long as its government's energies and resources are used in wasteful and largely needless armament and space races, ineffectual anti-ballistic missile systems, unenlightening propaganda warfare, or in supplying economic aid to conflicting groups in Vietnam, Korea, Nigeria, Indonesia, the Congo or Latin America.

Both superpowers must first of all recognize that economically "underdeveloped" countries are also politically underdeveloped in the sense that they are politically immature. Such countries are still organized politically on the basis of family, tribal or religious principles and have not yet reached the stage of the secular sovereign bureaucratic state. It is now increasingly apparent that the economic backwardness of much of the Third World is more the result of non-economic than of economic causes, and that political factors are among the more important of such non-economic causes. That the superpowers should allow political decisions affecting their own welfare and security to be influenced by politically immature peoples

like the Syrians, the Congolese, or the Cypriots, simply because the Soviet and United States governments are enmeshed in a tangle of enmity, raises doubts as to the degree of political maturity in Moscow and Washington.

THE COLD WAR

Reduction of Soviet-United States enmity, or liquidation of the cold war, is the central problem for the new administration in the years 1969-1973. The Soviet Union is at present divided within itself as to whether it should increase its trouble-making for the United States throughout the world or turn independently to its domestic problems. Under John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State in the period 1953-1960, the United States set up a cordon of relatively meaningless treaties around the Soviet Union: NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS, and the Japanese-American Treaty of 1954 (revised in 1960). In this cordon, the two chief links were Turkey (in both NATO and CENTO) and Pakistan (in both CENTO and SEATO).

The meaninglessness of this system, which the State Department still pretends to be viable (although it never was) may be seen best in South Asia where the political reality today is not the existence of a barrier against communism running east and west, but the presence of a large cross which shows Pakistan aligned with Communist China and, balancing this, India aligned with the Soviet Union. This situation is based on the realities of the rivalries of the area, chiefly the Pakistani-Indian conflict over Kashmir and the Indian-Chinese conflict over Ladakh. Both of these, like the Soviet-Chinese tensions over Mongolia, have been ignored as real forces determining political alignments in their areas by a State Department still obsessed with a stale Dullesian anti-communism. As long as American foreign policy is based on such an unrealistic view of the world, it will be relatively easy for the Soviet Union to stir up problems for the United States all along the fringes of Asia with relatively little cost or danger to itself. The

materials are lying ready, in Greece, in Cyprus, in the Near East, in all of South Asia, and in the Far East, to say nothing of Africa or Latin America.

Even if the United States closes its eyes to the fact that the policies of 1947-1962, based on anti-Communist and anti-Soviet clichés, are now obsolete, the need to seek new policies based on Soviet-American parallelism will be forced upon Americans by the inevitable spread of nuclear weaponry.

This is another matter on which the American people have been badly served by their government and the mass media. They have been alarmed by reports of Chinese nuclear explosions, and a so-called anti-Chinese anti-ballistic missile system has been authorized by the Congress with an initial cost estimate of five billion dollars. But the final bill will be closer to fifty billion dollars; the system will be largely ineffectual as an ABM system; and there is no need for such a system against a nonexistent Chinese missile if there is no need for it against very real Soviet missiles.

The realities of this situation have been largely missed. The real threat to the United States from missiles does not come from those based on foreign soil, whose origin can be determined if they are fired, but from missiles from unknown submarines relatively close to American shores, whose origin will be totally indeterminable as soon as more than two powers have such submarines. Once three or more powers have missile submarines, the whole structure of mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union will collapse, since neither will be able to determine the origin of any missile which comes in at relatively short range from the ocean.

This situation will not arise next year, but the need to begin to face it will exist next year, as, indeed, it has already existed for at least two years.

The American public has been badly misled on the subject of nuclear weapons. The first error has been the belief that anybody's security is increased by nuclear weapons or by any major breakthrough in weapons. *Po-*

laris missiles on submarines, which first made it necessary to return to city targeting when counter-targeting became impossible, will make mutual deterrence impossible as soon as several powers have them. Fortunately, we have also been misled in the double belief that obtaining nuclear warheads is difficult but that anyone can get a delivery system. The opposite is true. Obtaining nuclear weapons is easier and cheaper every year; up to 30 nations could produce them in the next decade if they made up their minds to do so. On the other hand, establishing a delivery system sophisticated enough to reach its target grows increasingly difficult every year, and it is doubtful, unless there is some totally unexpected new development in technology, if more than a few nations can produce a reliable vehicle for such warheads within the next decade.

Britain has been reduced to a third-rate power by her inability (and lack of will) to produce a delivery system for her warheads. President John Kennedy's decision in December, 1962, cancelling development of the Skybolt delivery system for Britain as too expensive and uncertain was one of the turning points in modern British history, marking the doom of Harold Macmillan's government and precipitating the veto by French President Charles de Gaulle on Britain's entry into the Common Market. President Kennedy's counter-offer of the *Polaris* missile, with only the plans for the nuclear submarine to carry it, still left a task too large for Britain's will and resources.

The French decision, now almost a decade old, to obtain an independent nuclear force had as its ultimate goal four nuclear submarines, each with sixteen *Polaris*-type missiles. These were expected to become operational in 1970-1972, but the recent political difficulties in France, combined with the normal problems of development, have now pushed these dates at least two years further off. If France, with all her wealth, know-how, and will, has difficulties of this size in obtaining such armaments, it can be seen that the prospects are not good for nations like Communist China. But the problems are there

and must be faced by the new administration in Washington. And they cannot be faced without a wholly new approach to United States foreign policy.

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

A new foreign policy must be based on recognition of certain principles:

1. The basic aim of American foreign policy must be the security of the United States.
2. The only state in a position to destroy or seriously injure the United States, now and in the foreseeable future, is the Soviet Union.
3. The Soviet Union has as much interest in its survival as we have in ours and, accordingly, has as much to gain as we have from mutual security. This involves, for both, freeing resources and energies for domestic problems and reducing, for both, troubles and dangers arising from the actions of other countries.
4. The nineteenth century idea that strategy should aim at creating a situation in which one's own country could win in any future war with its most dangerous opponent has been made obsolete by the development of a technology of mutual annihilation. Accordingly, American policy now must be aimed at avoidance of war with the Soviet Union and at finding ways to counterbalance the Soviet Union on the landmass of Eurasia by other powers and by means other than nuclear weaponry, if possible.
5. These other means must be found under a continued Soviet-American mutual strategic deterrent, but they must involve a drastic reduction in American readiness to use its ground forces or its conventional weapons within the Old World landmass to prevent Soviet, Chinese, or any other aggressions in that area.
6. This fifth point can be achieved only if there can be created *within the Old World landmass* a balance of powers which is self-rectifying without any United States military or political intervention. This requires the presence in that area of several Powers with sufficient strength to be able to deter aggression on the ground in Eurasia but not so strong as to threaten any one of them with a danger of unprovoked aggression from a neighbor.
7. Specifically, this means that the Soviet Union must be faced with two other superpowers on the Eurasian landmass, each alone too weak to be a threat to the Soviet Union, but together in a position to deter any Soviet conventional aggression in the area. More-

over, it is much more important that the Soviet Union feel secure in the west (Europe) than in the east (China). In fact, if the Soviets felt secure in Europe, Soviet forces would be moved from the European area to the Mongolian area, which would reduce the danger of any Soviet-encouraged instability in Europe or the Near East and would, at the same time, reduce the probability of any Chinese-sponsored instability in the Far East.

NATURE OF THE COLD WAR

The detailed implementation of this balancing of forces on the Old World landmass must be based on a far more accurate view of Russia, its past history and the nature of the cold war than is now generally available. There is not space here to provide this, but it is necessary to outline two new ways of looking at the cold war, one historical and long-range; one in terms of power politics today.

Five hundred years ago, Asia had a fringe of old and obsolescent cultures along its mountainous backbone running west to east from the Balkans to Yunnan. Most of these were built on the alluvial fertility of the monsoon-fed rivers flowing from that mountain backbone to the surrounding seas. Politically, this Buffer Fringe of Asia was ruled by despotic empires and principalities from the Ottoman Empire in the west, across Persia, India and Malaysia, to China and Japan in the east.

By 1500, two new and vigorous civilizations were beginning to intrude into this Buffer Fringe. One of these, the Russian, pushed from the area between the Pripyet Marshes and the Urals eastward over the North Asian grasslands and, by 1650, was crossing the Amur River into Chinese territory. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) between Russia and China established the Amur as the chief boundary between Chinese and Russian territory—as it still is—but the Russian pressure continued, pressing on the Buffer Fringe of Asia from the grasslands of the interior, constantly shifting the point of its pressure depending on the local resistance and the demands of internal problems within Russia. From 1770 until 1914, these pres-

ures alternated between the Far East in Manchuria and the Near East in the Balkans.

During this same period, beginning with Vasco da Gama's landing in India in 1498 and Ferdinand Magellan's landing in the Philippines in 1520, a new civilization from Western Europe was also intruding into the Buffer Fringe from the seas.

Of these two pressures, the one continental and the other oceanic, the latter was much more intense and more destructive to the ancient cultures of the Buffer Fringe, damaging them almost irretrievably in the period from the British attack on China in 1842 to the Japanese copy of that attack in 1931. From 1914 to 1945, German aggressions both on the Oceanic states and on Russia relieved much of Asia from the double pressure of Russia and the West, as had also happened earlier for a brief interval from about 1680 to about 1760.

But any long-range view will show that the predicament of the Buffer Fringe between Western Oceanic pressures and Russian continental pressures is not new in the cold war period but has been going on since at least 1500. Over that long period, the problem has remained about the same: Can the cultures of the Buffer Fringe of Asia, from Turkey to Japan, reform and strengthen themselves enough to resist these outside pressures? Or, if they do not, which of the two will dominate them and destroy them as viable cultures? These are the questions in 1968 as they were in 1500. But now, after more than four centuries of the destruction of indigenous communities, the West should finally consider the alternative of allowing these peoples to restructure themselves to become able to resist *both* alien cultures: Western individualism and Slavic totalitarianism.

A second, less long-range and perhaps less revealing way of looking at the cold war is simply in terms of the power areas of the globe in the last 25 years. In 1943, an astronaut over the north pole looking down on the globe would have seen it divided into four conflicting quadrants, opposite pairs allied to each other, and each quadrant in conflict with both adjacent quadrants. The Oceanic

Bloc of the English-speaking powers and the Fighting French was aligned with the opposite quadrant of the Continental Heartland of the Sino-Soviet Powers. (That is, the two intruders of the preceding paragraph were allied). These were in conflict with two transitory power blocs in the other two opposite quadrants, the Rome-Berlin Axis in Central Europe and Japan in the Far East. Two years later, in 1945, the two transitory power systems in the Far East and Central Europe had been liquidated and replaced by power vacuums in those areas. In each case, the power system which had contributed most to the liquidation of the transitory power system flowed most deeply into the resulting power vacuum area. That is, the United States, which contributed so much to the creation of the power vacuum in the Far East by the defeat of Japan, flowed deeply into the Far East, while the Soviet Union, which contributed so much to the creation of the power vacuum in Central Europe by the defeat of Germany, flowed deeply into Central Europe. These developments simply reflected the nature of political power. That being so, they should have been anticipated. Arrangements should have been made in 1943 for filling the inevitable power vacuums in the two enemy quadrants, without the hypocrisy and recriminations of 1945-1947.

No agreements were possible in 1943 about the division of influence in the Far East and Central Europe in 1945 because only one of the three Allied leaders, Winston Churchill, would consider the problem, and another leader, Franklin Roosevelt, flatly rejected such a settlement. Instead, all three, led by Roosevelt, adopted the unrealistic idea that the coalition which was functioning to win the war would also rule the postwar peace as a system of "great power cooperation." This was embodied in the Security Council of the United Nations, complete with a great power veto, such as had existed in the wartime coalition.

The difficulty with this was that the United States was apparently sincere in its belief that the postwar world could be governed

through a continuance of the wartime cooperation, but the Soviet Union had a totally different, and very Asiatic, view of its aim in the postwar world. This aim was to obtain local power domination in its own area by surrounding itself with a cordon of subsidiary states, known for millennia in Chinese history as "tributary states," and known to us in recent years as "satellite states." The Soviet Union's effort to establish such satellites on its borders, not only in the west, as in Poland, but also in the south, as in Iran, and in the east, as in Mongolia and northwestern China (although not in Manchuria), conflicted directly with the United States desire for great power cooperation (which had already been rejected in fact by United States conduct in Italy in 1943-1945). This conflict of aims was mistakenly interpreted by Washington as evidence of a Bolshevik plot to take over huge areas for communism. It was equally misinterpreted by the Kremlin as evidence of an assault by capitalistic imperialism on the workers' paradise of Soviet Russia. Thus the cold war was born—as most wars are—out of misunderstandings, ignorance and cross-purposes.

COLD WAR SETTLEMENT

These cross-purposes can be untangled, even at this late date, and must be untangled fairly soon, if we are to survive. An indication of the outlines of such a settlement can be described, working from west to east across the Eurasian landmass.

In the west a superpower should be sought in western Europe. This must include both West Germany and Great Britain, must have nuclear weapons, and must be completely independent of both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union will feel secure in the west, with a European Union possessing nuclear weapons, only if this union is not allied to the United States, only if Germany is not united in it, and only if the buffer of neutral and satellite states, including East Germany and Poland, continues.

The United States is legally committed to the reunification of Germany. Yet a

unified Germany in central Europe would be a great threat to the stability and, accordingly, the peace of Europe. It would recreate the conditions which led to war in 1914 and 1939 and would create these in a most precarious form, with a great nuclear power balanced in the center of Europe, spreading insecurity in all directions and exposing that area to sudden war if such a united Germany ever showed an inclination to lean to either the east or the west. On the other hand, a divided Germany, with the two halves aligned to the two parts of Europe, would constitute a force for peace by making the area one of conciliation rather than of animosity, for any conflict between the two parts of Europe would imply a conflict of Germans with Germans. And without being vindictive, a permanently divided Germany would show that the price of aggression is not always success.

The West European system, whatever form it takes, must contain Britain, freed from any special relationship with the United States. This requirement does not depend on de Gaulle's insistence but on the facts: (1) that a West Europe without Britain would not be strong enough to stand up to the Soviet Union without United States support; (2) that the lesser states of the West, such as Denmark or Benelux, are not willing to be in any close political arrangement with Germany (even only West Germany) unless Britain is a partner, because they do not completely trust Germany; and (3) that the special relationship with the United States has been a source of great injury to Britain, especially in recent years and under the last three British governments, hampering her ability to get to her real economic problems and her real political interests because of the need to be a tail on the American kite.

The Soviet Union, in view of its other problems and interests, could be contained in the west by such a West European arrangement and would, at the same time, not feel insecure in the west. It could, thus, turn its attention to the Far East, rather than the Near East.

In the Far East, according to the exag-

gerated United States view, the problem is a belligerent Communist China. Indeed, many in the State Department regard China as our chief enemy, despite the fact that China at present is weak and divided and is not growing noticeably stronger. The trouble in the Far East is not China's strength but rather her weakness.

The point is that, whatever China's strength may be, it can be countered in only two ways: by a strategic threat to China's territory or by local direct pressure on China's frontier. The strategic threat is weakened, not only by our general reluctance to use strategic weapons, especially when China is still allied, at least technically, to the Soviet Union, but also by the fact that China's size, low level of industrialization, and very decentralized condition make her an unfruitful target for nuclear weapons. Chemical and bacteriological weapons, especially those aimed at Chinese food crops, would be considerably more productive and more humane, but almost certainly could not be used by us (at least before strategic nuclear weapons) because of the general lack of sound information and clear thinking on these matters in the United States and throughout the world. In any case, any strategic attack on China would be needless and unproductive, because China's power, and even her aims, offer no immediate threat to American security.

This situation would also rule out any conventional United States attack on China, either directly or through Nationalist China, from Taiwan, Okinawa, and the sea. If it is necessary to contain China as an expansionist force on the Asia mainland, this must be done along her most vulnerable land frontier, the open grasslands of Mongolia; the pressure to restrain Chinese expansion, if and when it threatens, must be exercised by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union will do this if it is left free to do so, and it can do so by day-by-day increase of Soviet power in the area, such as will arise from the growth of population and Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia as well as the growth of Soviet population, industry and military strength in the Soviet

areas of east Asia. This process is already going on. In January, 1966, as a very pointed symbol of this process, the Soviet Union signed a mutual assistance pact with the Mongolian Republic. It is of some significance that the United States has no diplomatic relations with the Mongolian Republic, although the latter has been a member of the United Nations since October, 1961. It is perhaps not irrelevant that the greatest American authority on Mongolia, Professor Owen Lattimore of the Johns Hopkins University (now at University of Leeds, England), has been *persona non grata* to our State Department since he was attacked by Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin in 1950 as "the top Russian espionage agent" in the United States. Yet it is difficult for anyone to claim that "Red Chinese expansion" can be curbed more successfully by United States action in the jungles of southeast Asia than by Soviet pressures along China's longest and most exposed land frontier.

THE CHINESE MISSILE THREAT?

Another aspect of this problem is contingent on the possible Chinese missile of the relatively distant future. As has been indicated, the Chinese can ultimately produce a few ICBM's, if they are determined to do so, but the date of that achievement would be delayed by any need to divert technicians and resources to the manufacture of equipment for ground forces along the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. It is not clear what targets in the United States would be used for the first few such long-range missiles when the Chinese do obtain them, and it is obvious that the Chinese would have to get hundreds of them to be any real threat to the United States. Furthermore, it does not appear clear how even large numbers of Chinese ICBM's would ever become as great a danger to the United States as the Soviet ICBM's have been for years.

In other words, the burden of proof must rest on anyone who sees a major threat to the United States from Chinese ground-based nuclear missiles and advocates any substantial changes in the United States strategic

defense posture because of these. Without such proof, expenditures for items like the present tentative anti-ballistic missile system are more likely to be grants of public funds to the "military-industrial complex" than any real contribution to defense.

Furthermore, it is almost certain that the Chinese will have missiles in the 3,000-mile range before they have any in the almost 7,000-mile range needed to reach any worthwhile target in the United States from any likely missile sites in China. But such 3,000-mile missiles will be a direct threat to the Soviet Union and to Japan long before missiles of twice that range can threaten targets like San Francisco and Seattle or *Minuteman* missile sites in Montana. Thus Russia and Japan must begin to take steps to protect themselves against Chinese missiles and must begin to cooperate in doing so long before the United States is threatened by Chinese land-based missiles. In addition, if the Chinese can leap-frog over the stage of ground-based missiles to achieve the more difficult stage of submarine-based missiles, the Soviet Union must cooperate with the United States in the control of such Chinese submarines in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans if the Soviet-American mutual deterrence is to be preserved.

In a discussion such as this, based on future capabilities, there is little need for any extended discussion of Chinese or Soviet intentions. It has been an established principle of strategic studies for generations that strategic decisions seeking security must be based on the capabilities rather than the intentions of any potential enemy. In fact, it is capability rather than intention which makes a state an "enemy."

Chinese intentions are probably not very
(Continued on page 240)

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This author compares the Negro's problem with that of earlier ethnic groups and points out that "the very fact of belatedness produces distinctive problems for the Negro. The Negro problem as we know it . . . is a feature of post-World War II America, not of the 1890's. This difference in timing has many important consequences. . . . Indeed, since individual Negroes of whatever standing are perceived by white America as Negroes, it would be strange if Negro Americans did not perceive politics primarily as Negroes."

Negroes, Ethnic Groups and American Politics

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MUCH can be learned by comparing the present "Negro problem" and its possible solutions with the earlier patterns of ethnic adjustment. The uncovering of meaningful parallels and equivalents can go far to suggest direction and strategy for Negro efforts to advance Negro status, while the identification of truly idiosyncratic characteristics of the Negro problem can lead to the avoidance of inappropriate goals and techniques.

American attitudes towards the place of ethnicity in American life are ambivalent and often contradictory. One strand, more pronounced in popular thought than in practice, hails the pluralism of the United States and seems to encourage each ethnic group to maintain its distinctiveness as its contribution to this diversely-composed nation. Another strand, more practiced than preached, encourages ethnic groups to shed their distinctive characteristics rapidly, the goal being a more uniform United States modeled, perhaps, on an implicit Anglo-Saxon ideal.

Perceptions of the relationship of ethnicity to politics strikingly illustrate this ambivalence. The joining in the United States of ethnic pluralism with democratic political rights naturally promotes an ethnic style of

group politics that should be both acknowledged and approved. Yet many Americans tend to deny that ethnicity is related to politics or, if they admit the relationship, they deplore it. The study of ethnic politics—and it is a seriously understudied area—typically treats it as an unhappy aspect of an allegedly discreditable system of urban boss-and-machine politics.

Some of the reasons underlying the denigration of ethnic politics seem dubious upon examination.

Ethnic politics is held to deviate from the ideal of the individual voter making up his mind through exposure to full information and objective deliberation. Yet it is evident few voters adhere to that standard in any case. Analysis of voter behavior in the United States demonstrates that, for most voters, voting is a social or group phenomenon; a voter's exposure to political information is restricted and biased in favor of confirming his prior leanings; and the reaffirmation of one's party attachment is far more typical than is an objective and fresh reconsideration of the choices presented by the campaign. It is false, then, to suggest that ethnic politics is group-based whereas non-ethnic politics is not. The real question is why so many Americans are

willing to accept the naturalness and legitimacy of political action based on economic and economic-group concerns, and so unwilling to extend that acceptance to a politics based on ethnic and ethnic-group identification and goals.

Ethnic politics is held to be an exploitative and meaningless politics, i.e., a politics unrelated to the real needs of minority nationality and religious groups. That parties and political leaders have often exploited ethnic groups for selfish purposes is clear enough. But it should be equally clear that the psychological and elementary material needs of ethnic groups were often well served by the interplay between immigrant bloc voting and the city machine. Once again, only those who are committed to some notion of a purely economics-based politics as the sole form of legitimate purposeful politics can fail to appreciate the meaningfulness of immigrant-style politics to immigrant groups.

Ethnic politics is held to indicate an unwillingness on the part of the ethnic group to become fully and rapidly assimilated into the larger culture. Broadly speaking, this is simply a mistaken inference. To the extent that an ethnic group conspicuously maintained a pronounced ethnic style of politics, the reason lay less with the group's rejection of the goal of rapid assimilation than with hostile attitudes on the part of the rest of society which compelled the ethnic group to retain a collective identification.

Ethnic politics is held to retard the assimilation process for members of ethnic groups. There can be little doubt that a politics making heavy use of ethnic-group identity and resources often sustains an ethnic self-consciousness and cohesion well beyond its otherwise natural decline. But there is much to be said for the other side of the story. For many ethnic groups, political influence and careers were more open to them than was advancement in the private sector. The successful conduct of ethnic politics implied a growing acceptance of the ethnic group by the larger society, and necessarily involved the group and its leaders in democratic training by requiring their accommodation to diverse group

claims. The initial political inwardness of the group thus contributed importantly to a process which ultimately spurred the integration of ethnic groups into American life.

However much defenders and critics of ethnic politics may disagree on the preceding points, they usually share the view that ethnic pursuit of a self-conscious group politics is part of a transitional process which, for politics at least, concludes with a virtually complete de-emphasis of ethnicity. Some analysts have suggested predictable stages of political assimilation, often involving a three-generation progression from the original immigrant alien through the American-born second generation.

In the first stage, recent immigrants comprise a mostly homogeneous group with a high sense of group consciousness and strong cohesion; nearly all have low economic status and an absence of prestige in the larger society. For political leadership above the petty level, members of ethnic groups at this stage depend on influential politicians drawn from previously assimilated ethnic groups.

The second stage is indexed by greater socio-economic heterogeneity within the ethnic group; increasing proportions are in the lower-middle and the middle class. Its political leadership is drawn more from its own ranks, and those leaders have access to more important offices enjoying larger constituencies. This is the stage political analyst Samuel Lubell has commented on perceptively: members of the ethnic group pursue a "passion for respectability" which involves, among other things, a politics of ethnic recognition, broadly defined.

The third stage sees the ethnic group as close to final political assimilation. Its members are highly diverse in class position, and its upper and middle classes tend to see ethnic politics as embarrassing or irrelevant, or both. Political solidarity no longer exists and non-ethnic factors become the determinants of voting and partisan choice. Ethnic-oriented politics has been displaced, in short, by a slack class politics.

If the salience of ethnicity has declined rapidly within the first few generations of

immigrant stock, what substitutes for it now as the common basis of one's self-identification and one's identification by others? Author Will Herberg has shrewdly argued¹ that religious identification has increasingly subsumed ethnicity. American values have heavily influenced that development. In contemporary times, at least, the maintenance of one's religious identity, in sharp contrast to the retention of one's ethnic identification, is not merely permitted but is strongly encouraged as an essential part of being an American. American democracy, in this view, is seen as based on religious values, and each of the major religions serves as an equivalent moral guide in this respect. President Dwight Eisenhower captured this outlook succinctly when he observed, "Our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith—and I don't care what it is." The three religious communities of Protestant, Catholic and Jew thus are held to comprise today's ingredients of America as a "melting pot."

The related theses of the decline of ethnicity and of its displacement by religious identity require two serious qualifications. Judging at least from the experience of New York City, ethnic identity persists in subtle forms insufficiently appreciated by the relatively crude concept of tri-generational assimilation. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan put the amended proposition well:

The principal ethnic groups of New York City will be seen maintaining distinct identity, albeit a changing one, from one generation to the next. . . . As the [ethnic] groups were transformed by influences in American society, stripped of their original attributes, they were recreated as something new, but still as identifiable groups. Concretely, persons think of themselves as members of that group, with that name; they are

thought of by others as members of that group, with that name; and most significantly, they are linked to other members of the group by new attributes that the original immigrants would never have recognized as identifying their group, but which nevertheless serve to mark them off, by more than simply name and association, in the third generation and even beyond.²

The second qualification is that the development of religious identification is less a displacement of or a substitute for ethnicity than it is a blending or intertwining of the two. Oscar Handlin makes the point with reference to ethnic communal organizations in the New York City area:

These associations showed a striking vitality. Although their ranks were no longer being replenished by immigration, they gained strength through the acquisition of an indigenous quality that relieved them of the taint of foreignness. After 1945, the religious element was more often stressed in these affiliations than earlier; but within the broadly recognized categories of Protestant, Catholic, and Jew, narrower groups retained their individuality, as did some outside those categories, like the Greeks and Russians.³

Negroes share with members of ethnic groups the quest for a psychologically satisfying personal and social identity as Americans. Commonalities exist, but the magnitude of the difficulties which Negroes have faced may well require that theirs be recognized as a special case. For one thing, the Negro has been victimized by society's indifference and oversight as much as by its hostility, e.g., as pinpointed by the titles of Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* and James Baldwin's *Nobody Knows My Name*.⁴

For another, no ethnic group in the United States—except perhaps the American Indian—has suffered society's rejection and repression so durably and deeply. Nor has any other group been confined so pervasively to inferior status and position, been denied elemental political rights, and been given so many reasons, from theological to biological, why others' supremacy and their subordinacy were natural, legitimate, justifiable and desirable.

Finally, the conditions of entry and servitude for the Negro were altogether different from the history of ethnic groups in America.

¹ In *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

² Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge: M.I.T. and Harvard University Press, 1963), p. vi., p. 13.

³ Oscar Handlin, *The Newcomers* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 68–69.

⁴ Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man* (New York: Modern Library, 1963); James Baldwin, *Nobody Knows My Name* (New York: Dial Press, 1961).

One of the consequences has been the denial to Negroes of a sense of a distinctive past and culture in which they could take pride. As Baldwin has noted, "... the American Negro has arrived at his identity by virtue of the absoluteness of his estrangement from his past."⁵

The immigrants' mixture of radical and conservative perspectives on the United States also characterizes that of most Negroes. The radicalism consists of the acceptance of the promise and the dream of America, of its ethic of the opportunity for success, mobility and the advancement of the individual by his own efforts. The conservatism comprises the commitment to work within ongoing values and institutions to achieve that promise. Like the ethnic groups before them, Negroes seek less to alter the system than to secure their fair benefits from it. Not "the system must be overthrown," but "we shall overcome" is the rallying cry.

The inclusion of "we" in the latter motto reminds us that the pressure for racial advance, like the earlier ethnic group quest, must proceed on a collective, group basis. Acceptance of Negroes one by one in the larger society gives no assurance of mass advance; indeed, it has served in the past to alienate one Negro class segment from another. Collective race gains, however, are certain to redound to the actual or potential benefit of each Negro.

A view of the contemporary Negro situation as that of "belated immigrants" usefully prods thought on possible parallels between the two phenomena, but the very fact of belatedness produces distinctive problems for the Negro. The Negro problem as we know and live it today is a feature of post-World War II America, not of the 1890's. This difference in timing has many consequences.

A group's notion of the pace and character of its "advancement" is necessarily relative. Relative to what? Clearly, American Negroes are not disposed to measure their progress by the yardstick of the position of the Negro in the South and nation 50 or 100 years

ago, or by the current status of black Africans. Appropriately, Negroes measure their progress relative to other groups in American society—and by that comparison the lot of the Negro has been bleak, and by many indices it is getting bleaker. In the earlier immigrant days and even as late as the 1930's, Negroes might take comfort from the fact that they were not alone in high rates of poverty, unskilled labor and unemployment or in being the objects of discrimination. After 1945, however, the Negro could not help but recognize and resent the fact that the other groups—all later arrivals to the United States than he—fully shared in the rising affluence of American life, while his remained the major marginal group in the nation. Worse yet, those groups that had passed him by seemed driven by their "passion for respectability" to resist comparable Negro efforts to advance. The urgency and intensity of current Negro demands must be understood in this context of the 1960's: the Negro sees himself as a lonely traveler on roads lacking clear markers, desperately trying to catch up.

The high fraction of unskilled and lower class people among today's Negroes may not be dissimilar to that of immigrant groups at their earlier stages, but the economy is fundamentally different. The capacity of earlier ethnic groups to "make it," to exploit the opportunities for occupational and class mobility, was doubtless as much a function of the characteristics of the economy as of the prevailing individualistic work-and-success ethic and the efforts of the ethnics themselves. Today, unskilled labor is a drag on the economy, and it constitutes an enlarging proportion of the unemployed and the unemployables. In having to penetrate and mold the institutional forces that control much of current economic life in the United States, Negroes must operate at a competitive handicap relative to today's Americans—most of whom were yesterday's immigrants. This is only one of the many reasons why Negroes, unlike earlier ethnic groups, must focus their demands on securing protective and affirmative governmental policies and actions.

The belated timing of the Negroes' coming

⁵ *Notes of a Native Son* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 174.

of age also means that their attempt to develop political resources and claims in the manner of earlier ethnic groups will meet with greater resistance. The racially self-conscious and collective character of Negro voting needs no apology or extended explanation in light of the history of American treatment of the Negro. Indeed, since individual Negroes of whatever standing are perceived by white America as Negroes, it would be strange if Negro Americans did not perceive politics primarily as Negroes.

The political behavior of the Negro today is thus at the initial stage of the tri-generational pattern earlier discussed and is the modern counterpart of the immigrant political ethic. That ethic has been well characterized by Richard Hofstadter as one which "... took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs, interpreted political and civic relations chiefly in terms of personal obligations, and placed strong personal loyalties above allegiance to abstract codes of law or morals."⁶

For reasons outlined earlier, ethnic-oriented politics has always been suspect in America, and Negro bloc voting is similarly disapproved. But timing once again places a special burden on the Negro. With the cessation of mass immigration nearly 50 years ago, and with the class rise of ethnic groups since 1945, middle-class values are now displacing those associated with the earlier stages of ethnicity. Central to those middle-class values are commitments to individual merit as the basis for advance and to community-wide policies and perspectives, implying in both instances a rejection of the personalistic, segmental and parochial outlooks associated with the older style of ethnic politics. *The New York Times* represents a good example of the point. A vigorous supporter of governmental protection for the Negro, *The New York Times* is implacably hostile to continuance of the "balanced ticket" in elections, to the imposition of benign racial quotas for employment, and the like. Such ethnic-style techniques to promote Negro influence are, in *The New York*

Times' judgment, unjustifiable deviations from the proper standard of individual worth independent of group considerations, i.e., the middle-class attachment to the concept of meritocracy. This problem is of no small importance to Negro politics, since middle-class liberal ideologues and reformers constitute the prime source of white support for the Negro cause.

BLACK POWER

A selective examination of the contemporary Negro viewpoint known as "Black Power" serves to sharpen the inquiry into the Negro-ethnic parallel, with special reference to current American politics. Black Power means very different things to different people, and perhaps can be better described as a mood or an incipient movement rather than as a doctrine. Yet it seems to have central directions which can be identified and which merit brief comment.

Black Power calls for the development of black communities in areas of concentrated Negro population around the nation. These communities would develop internal institutions fashioned from their own needs and resources and they would be sustained in good part from resources wrested from the white society. The levers of coercion include the political power of the bloc vote and the economic power of boycott and strike, and other forms of forceful persuasion, not excluding types of disruption employed in earlier times by labor unions and by ethnic groups. So viewed, Black Power may be understood to embrace at least the following: black nationalism; a commitment to collective affirmative identity and self-help; a repudiation, in some degree, of the goals and rate of progress of the "civil rights movement"; a directional strategy for Negro entry into America, as distinguished from mere Negro existence in America.

Black nationalism involves a rejection of the white view of the Negro as inferior, a positive affirmation of the Negro's history and his future, and a turning inward of the Negro group, accompanied by some degree of repudiation of the white world. Qualify-

⁶ Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 5.

ing in all these respects as a variant of black nationalism, Black Power is especially attractive to the identity needs of urban, ghettoized Negroes of the North. The voluntary race separatism it stresses is intended not merely to provide the collective means for material improvement, but to build up a self-confidence to the point where blacks can confront and can compete with whites on psychologically equal terms.

In this sense, the insistence on black-determined school curricula, on moving the Negro from the margins to the center of the stage of American history and on forging meaningful links with the richness of an African past represents profoundly pro-American sentiments. Ethnic groups similarly sought to reaffirm their American identity by linking to a distinctive and prideful past and by adopting a somewhat ethnocentric view of their roots and place in America.

Race advance is seen by Black Power not as a cumulation or aggregation of individuals, but in terms of a group conscious of its own special identity and interests. This is a sensible reading of American history and denotes one of the persistent appeals of any black nationalist doctrine: a group in America does not attain equality without first developing institutions that express and support a sense of its own worth and distinctiveness. Stokely Carmichael has shrewdly observed that "you can integrate communities, but you assimilate individuals." Until blacks have developed viable and self-run communities, a push toward integration implies either the assimilation of only a relative trickle of middle-class Negroes or a degrading assimilation of blacks on essentially white terms or both.

It is in this context that the anti-integration and pro-separatism positions of Black Power must be understood. The same reasoning underlies Black Power's discouragement of coalitions and alliances with whites, in politics and other areas. It is not that the need for such alliances is denied; rather Black Power recognizes that until blacks have developed a sufficient base of their own, any alliance with whites will simply continue the older tradition of black dependency.

Black Power is cynical about the utility of grounding race advance on the appeal to the white conscience of the moral justice of the Negro cause. Politics is seen as a hard-nosed clash of self-interests, as a matter of power and not of morality. Black Power also rejects white middle-class values as overtly or covertly racist, and it talks of the need for values that stress humanity rather than material success. This is part of the "radical" attack on "institutional racism," analogizing the lot of the Negro in America to that of a colonial people exploited by an imperialist white nation. The radicalism draws more from Fidel Castro and Frantz Fanon than from Karl Marx or W. E. B. Du Bois and is poorly defined analytically or programmatically, but it provides cathartic expression for the anger of blacks against white America. It also fuels the explicit rejection of the doctrine of non-violence associated with the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. A commitment to meet force with force is not the same thing, of course, as a commitment to initiate violence. Yet it is a fine line to walk in practice, and the threat of ghetto violence seems to be an inescapable new element of the multi-faceted Negro problem in America.

POLITICS AND THE NEGRO PROBLEM

The emergence and appeal of Black Power attitudes confirm a basic truth about the path of Negro advance. Acceptance of this truth should dispel once and for all misleading rhetoric which can only disillusion Negroes, embitter race relations and promote self-defeating public policy.

Stated negatively, this truth consists in the repudiation of "raceless individualism" as an appropriate or feasible goal to guide policymaking on the Negro problem for the fore-

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Discussing the many economic problems that will challenge the new administration in January, this economist believes that "the fragile balance between restrained wage and price increases has been shaken and there are many who worry that it will be some time before the balance is reestablished."

The Challenge of Inflation

By MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

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EVERYONE IS IN FAVOR of price stability, but some favor a little more of it than others. In the 1968 presidential campaign, both the Democrats and the Republicans seem to be in favor of more of it.

There has not always been such unanimity. In earlier and more tranquil days, one of the parties, usually the Democrats, would often place much more emphasis on economic growth or on the reduction of unemployment. But within the last three years, inflation has become an increasingly serious problem. In 1968, there is a feeling within both parties that some restraint on economic growth may be necessary in order to hold down the rise in prices. Unless a proper solution to inflation is found, there is fear that the long-run consequences for economic growth and full employment will be much more severe.

In the euphoric conditions which existed during the 1964 elections there were virtually no economic issues. Thus there was no need to wonder whether or not a little inflation would be better than a sacrifice in economic growth. To the wonderment of many observers, the country seemed to be enjoying both remarkable price stability *and* economic growth. From 1960 to 1965, prices rose only about 6.5 per cent, that is, less than 1.5 per cent a year. Moreover, real Gross National Product (GNP) in the same period rose by 26 per cent or about 4.5 per cent a year. For the first time in almost nine years, unemployment rates fell below the 5 per cent level in

1964 after having reached as high as 6.7 per cent in 1961.

Finally, Congress reduced income taxes. The simultaneous combination of stable prices, economic growth, improved employment and a tax reduction was an experience seldom enjoyed before in American economic history. Clearly, there was little in the realm of economics for the Republicans to complain about. To all intents and purposes, this *was* the economy of a "Great Society." Inflation and economic growth simply were not issues. The only bleak economic note was that there was still an unfavorable balance of payments. But the balance of trade (a major component of the balance of payments) had improved and was \$6.5 billion in our favor in 1964, still not enough to offset the spending from such activities as our foreign investments and American tourists.

The contrast with economic conditions in 1968 is not a cheery one. Except for the unemployment rate—which at the beginning of this summer was hovering around 3.5 per cent—and the rate of economic growth—which picked up again in 1968 after having fallen below 3 per cent in 1967—most of the other economic indicators have taken an undesirable turn. The consumer price index has been rising at the rate of 3.5 per cent to 4 per cent a year. Moreover, close to \$3 billion or slightly less than one-third of the present stock of gold has been transferred to other countries from the account of the

United States Treasury since mid-1967. Even more disturbing, in March, 1968, the United States experienced its first negative balance of trade in five years.

Unpleasant as these events may be, it is necessary to stress that the United States economy is not on the verge of collapse. It is still very healthy and dynamic, but after such a distinguished few years, any difficulty at all is a setback. From the voter's point of view, a period characterized by stable prices, exceptional economic growth and a tax cut has been superseded by a period of rising prices, somewhat more erratic growth and an income tax surcharge.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE GOOD OLD DAYS?

What has led to this undesirable change in our economic fortunes? An examination of the causes will not only show us what went wrong, but it will also illustrate the challenges inflation creates for the presidential candidates.

Most observers would agree that the major factor affecting the economic situation was a political consideration—the war in Vietnam. The intensification of the war in late 1965 stimulated a sharp increase of demand pressures in both the butter and guns sectors of the economy, as the additional money spent on military needs was used in turn by civilians to increase their own purchases. For a time it was felt that the country could produce enough to satisfy both the growing consumer sector and the even faster growing military sector. In other words, it could supply both more butter and more guns. But as some economists argued at the time, without some curtailment in spending, such a policy would be too much for even the rich American economy and the inevitable result would be an increase in inflationary pressure.

The increased demands of the war had the effect of unsettling a very delicate mechanism—the “wage price guidelines.” Created by the President's Council of Economic Advisers under President John F. Kennedy, these guidelines had been a major factor in holding down prices from 1961 to 1964. They were

introduced because the Council of Economic Advisers had concluded that price stability could not be attained as long as the union leaders could insist on higher wages despite the existence of unemployment, and as long as management could raise prices even though its factories were operating at considerably less than full capacity. Previously, it was assumed that prices under such circumstances would fall in the presence of unemployment and excess capacity. In any case, prices were not supposed to rise. Nonetheless, despite a recession in 1957–1958 and very slow economic growth in the years prior to 1961, prices did rise.

Economists ultimately came to explain the rising price trend by pointing out that the labor and product markets were less competitive than they had been. Therefore, since the traditional market forces were not providing the restraint that usually sufficed to hold down most price increases, the Council of Economic Advisers in 1962 suggested that perhaps it might help to supplement the market forces with some kind of rational wage price guideline. It was hoped that the moral pressures of the government would help restrain management from increasing its prices and would also strengthen management in holding the line against exorbitant wage demands. It was reasoned that management negotiators would be aided if they could say “your wage demands are not only above our capacity to pay, but they are unpatriotic because they violate the guidelines established by the government.” The wage price guidelines did not have the force of law, which obviously weakened their effectiveness. But offsetting this was the fact that their informal nature obviated the need for a stifling and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Not only did the wage price guidelines make good political sense, they also made good economic sense. The economists recognized that workers, as well as managers, landowners and capital owners, had come to expect and insist on higher payments for their services over the years. This was perfectly reasonable since historically it had been shown that the various factors of production had

been continuously increasing their productivity. Thus even though the quantity of inputs in the production process might remain constant, output tended to increase about 3.2 per cent a year. In other words, even if no new workers were hired or no new equipment put into use, there would be 3.2 per cent more product around the country to distribute than there had been the previous year. This was because the existing productive factors, like labor and machinery, had become more efficient.

Based on this phenomenon, government economists argued that it was only natural that the worker should expect to share in the fruits of his increased productivity. Furthermore, the wage of the average worker could be increased by 3.2 per cent without any need for a price increase and without any sacrifice to the manager or the stockholder. To illustrate why, let us suppose that a factory with one worker increased its output from \$1000 to \$1032, that is by 3.2 per cent. This would allow it to increase the worker's wage from \$100 to \$103.20 (again 3.2 per cent) and would also provide management with an extra \$28.80. As the Council of Economic Advisers pointed out, this just happened to be equal to 3.2 per cent of the nonwage portion of the company's expenses. Therefore, because productivity of all the factors of production had increased, everyone would be entitled to a higher return for his efforts, and most important of all, this could all be done with no increase in prices.

It happened, of course, that not everyone played the game according to these rules. Furthermore, some enterprises — especially those involved in providing services — were not able to increase their productivity by 3.2 per cent. Nonetheless the workers still demanded and usually obtained wage increases. It was hoped that this would be offset by those firms which increased their productivity by more than 3.2 per cent while managing to hold their wage increases to 3.2 per cent. To prevent management from profiting unduly by keeping the increased residual for itself, the Council of Economic Advisers urged that profits be reduced by passing on all produc-

tivity increases over 3.2 per cent in the form of price reductions. Not too many economists were surprised to learn that this aspect of the program was not entirely successful. Yet a surprising number of companies did lower their prices and on the whole the wage price guidelines seemed to work. As we saw, once the guidelines were introduced, price rises were held to about 1.5 per cent a year. The economy continued to grow at a steady rate and a remarkably large number of people seemed to be prospering. The general attitude seemed to be "You can have yours as long as I can have mine."

INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR

This even-handed principle was seriously violated in 1965 and 1966. The tempo of the war was increased sharply; but for a variety of political reasons President Lyndon Johnson did not reveal the full economic cost of this escalation. It was probable that he did not want to risk a tax increase before the congressional elections of 1966. But the increase in spending in Vietnam to approximately \$20 billion a year created all kinds of undesirable effects. It sharply increased demands on domestic capacity. This in turn led to an intensification in the bidding for goods and services. As might be expected, a new rush of price increases ensued since American suppliers were either unable to satisfy all the increased demands for their products or were unwilling to sell their goods at the low prices which prevailed previously.

The effect of all this on the balance of trade was bad enough, but in many ways the impact on the wage price guidelines will probably prove to have been more serious in the long run. As prices rose, profits rose at a completely unanticipated rate. While this was going on, the workers reacted angrily. Because their salaries had been fixed by contract (often held to an increase of 3.2 per cent) they had to watch while corporate profits in 1965 and early 1966 shot up by as much as 25 per cent to 50 per cent over an already prosperous base. Of course, one of the reasons why profits went up so fast was that management was able to hold labor

costs constant and pocket the difference. From the worker's point of view, this was very unfair. Now the prevailing attitude was "You are getting yours, and I'm getting nothing—but just you wait."

True to their word, as soon as a union's contract came up for renewal, its leaders dropped all pretense of adhering to the 3.2 per cent guideline. By 1968, the larger unions were winning increases as high as 6 per cent a year; almost double the now mythical rate of 3.2 per cent. Inevitably, wage increases of this size necessitated price increases, since the manufacturers were unwilling to absorb the difference in reduced profits. Thus the fragile balance between restrained wage and price increases has been shaken and there are many who worry that it will be some time before the balance is reestablished.

WHAT IS SO BAD ABOUT A LITTLE INFLATION?

Some of the consequences of the new inflationary climate have already been mentioned. Whatever semblance of agreement there might have been between management and labor for the common economic good was abandoned as each side struggled to preserve or to improve its own relative standing in an arena which had suddenly become very dynamic. As long as prices and incomes were changing slowly, there was no need for panic since there was little likelihood that any one group would suddenly find itself in a radically different economic position. But as prices and incomes began to fluctuate sharply, it was clear that if any segment of the economy rested for very long, it ran the risk that its relative standing would deteriorate sharply. This is due to the fact that many of the changes in prices and incomes were not continuous or gradual changes. Most price and income changes are usually made in lump form. As long as the overall price index is moving at 1.5 per cent a year, there is little noticeable change. But when the tempo accelerates to 3.5 per cent or 4 per cent a year, then the change becomes noticeable and more frequent. This is when the barber and the laundryman raise their prices, a rise much

more easily noticed than a one-cent increase in the price of corn flakes.

The jockeying that takes place amid such maneuvering is hard to avoid. Then people begin to fear that they are being left behind the more articulate and better organized pressure groups. Similarly the pressure groups make their feelings known by means of strikes. A "speculative fever" begins to take root. After a time, it seems almost axiomatic that prices will rise each year. This then becomes a premise in all decision-making. Buildings are purchased, factories are expanded and products are produced not just because these projects will yield a satisfactory return in today's situation, but because there will be an extra margin of profit due to the inevitable prospect that rents and prices will be higher in a few months. Therefore expenditures are made that would never be considered in periods of price stability. In fact, people who hold on to cash face the probability that the cash will diminish in value because a dollar spent tomorrow will buy less than a dollar spent today. This, too, increases the demand pressures on the economic resources of the country. Ultimately, there is a danger that this speculation will become so wild that people will overcommit themselves and then will be unable to fulfill their overextended expectations. If this should happen, there could be a serious economic recession.

THE GOLD CRISIS

Complications also develop in our foreign economic relations. As mentioned earlier, because of our price increases it becomes cheaper to import foreign goods. The concomitant of this is that foreign buyers find that American goods are no longer as desirable as before because of the higher prices and therefore our exports also fall.

The rise in imports increases the outflow of dollars from the United States and, unfortunately, the fall in exports means that there is no offsetting inflow of dollars. Since there are too many dollars in circulation overseas, foreigners try to cash them in either for gold or for other currencies such as the Swiss franc. This leads to an increase in the number of

dollars one must pay for an ounce of gold or a Swiss franc which is the same as saying that the dollar is worth less. When this happens, fewer and fewer foreigners want to hold on to the dollars they have, fearing that the dollar will buy even less in the future.

If the price of gold rises high enough above the official rate of \$35 an ounce, a devaluation of the dollar might ensue with the price of gold increasing to something like \$70 an ounce. It would then take twice as many dollars as before to buy something in a foreign country. Such a devaluation would disrupt the whole international trade apparatus that has worked so well for the last 20 years. The prevention of such an occurrence in itself would justify greater price stabilization in the United States.

THE SOLUTION

Clearly, the domestic and foreign consequences of inflation are serious and must be confronted by all candidates. What measures are available for controlling the situation? The most obvious solution is a curtailment of expenditures in Vietnam. Similarly, some other sector of government spending—such as highway construction—could be reduced. Alternatively, taxes could be raised even higher than the tax increase effective as of April 1, 1968.

Higher taxes or reduced expenditures would reduce demand pressures on the economy. Incidentally, such measures would also serve to reduce the growth of the government's national debt. Because there tends to be confusion about the impact of the federal debt, it is worth noting that the federal debt in itself is not necessarily the cause of inflation. In fact, in the 20 years since World War II, municipal and state debt as well as private debt had a much greater inflationary effect. As shown in Table 1, federal debt in 1946 constituted 58 per cent of the country's total debt, whereas in 1966, federal debt amounted to only 21 per cent of the total debt. Moreover, corporate, individual and state and local debt were all at least five times larger in 1966 than in 1946, while federal debt only increased by about 20 per cent.

TABLE 1
Public and Private Debt
(in billions of dollars)

	1946	1966
Total	397.4	1,346.0
Federal	229.7	279.9
State & Local	13.6	100.9
Corporate	93.5	497.2
Individual	60.6	468.0

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1960* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 388. *Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 404.

Therefore, even if the federal debt is reduced, there may still be an inflationary problem unless private borrowing and spending and state and local borrowing and spending are similarly reduced.

One way to depress private and state and municipal borrowing is to increase rates on the money that is borrowed. Monetary policy decisions such as these are normally the province of the Federal Reserve Bank system. Theoretically, the Federal Reserve Banks are supposed to be independent of the United States Treasury but the Secretary of the Treasury has been known to nudge the Federal Reserve Banks now and then in the direction desired by the President.

If the remedies are so straightforward, why has nothing been done sooner? The answer is that even though the solutions may be straightforward, the shortest distance between two points in political life is not always a straight line. It will not be easy to curb our activities in Vietnam. Similarly, it should be even harder to cut our domestic expenditures on urban problems and poverty although that seems to be the course we have traditionally taken.

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Summarizing the political issues raised by selective service, this military historian notes that in 1968, "Interest in the draft was so strong that all the major candidates for the presidential nominations felt it necessary to take a position well before the nominating conventions."

Selective Service as a Political Issue

By JAMES A. HUSTON

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MILITARY CONSCRIPTION promises to be more of a political issue in 1968 than it has been in any general election since 1864. Even in 1864, it did not turn out to be a critical issue in the presidential contest, although in August, 1864, the political overtones were obvious during congressional debates on amending the draft law.

During World War I, the draft was established shortly after the declaration of war. Since it ended with the war, it never figured in a political campaign, though a good deal of political controversy accompanied the passage and operation of the act. The 1940 Selective Training and Service Bill went before Congress in the very midst of a hotly contested presidential campaign. President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself avoided any firm stand on the question until after his nomination for a third term had been secured. Then he urged adoption of the measure. When Wendell Willkie came out for it, this removed the draft as a campaign issue.

Less than a year after the act of 1940 had been allowed to expire, President Harry S. Truman in March of the campaign year of 1948 asked for renewal of the draft. Congress approved the new legislation in June, on the eve of the presidential contest. However, New York's Governor Thomas E. Dewey—the Republican presidential candidate—made no major issue of it, and apparently the President and the members of Congress suffered no political disadvantages.

Again at the urging of the President, in June, 1951, Congress approved the so-called "Universal Military Training and Service Act" which essentially extended the law of 1948. Successive extensions have kept selective service in continuous operation since 1948. The most recent extension, the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, is scheduled to remain in force through June 30, 1971. But with the continuation of the war in Vietnam, the draft law in principle—or particular provisions in it—have been subject to increasing criticism on the part of political leaders as well as certain groups within the country and the general public.

In examining the issues relating to military conscription and the operation of a selective service system, it is first necessary to examine the purpose or purposes behind such a program. Frequently there is confusion among three related though distinct objectives: military training, military service and rapid mobilization for an emergency. Some would add a fourth, a social purpose: the use of military training programs to make up for deficiencies in education and to provide training useful for a civilian occupation. It is common to see all these objectives combined, and sometimes an act framed essentially to serve one purpose is criticized on the ground of failing to serve another. Thus, the original enactment of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 emphasized *training*. As a training program, it made sense to rotate

men into the armed forces for one year to be replaced regularly by new men. Rotation of a large number of men was the way to develop a reserve of trained men. Journalists and historians alike have reported breathlessly how passage of the Service Extension Act of 1941 by a margin in the House of Representatives of only one vote barely saved the Army from dissolution only 16 weeks before Pearl Harbor. But the system under the act presumably was operating as a training vehicle, not to provide manpower for unlimited service in the armed forces. Service extension merely extended the term of service of the inductees, and in so doing it put the emphasis upon military service—soon to be *war* service—rather than merely upon training.

Whether or not military conscription should be used for social purposes—where the byproducts of basic education and technical training come in for primary consideration—is subject to great debate. The Defense Department, in its “project 100,000” for training men previously rejected on account of failure to meet educational standards, has accepted this, at least to a degree, as one of its missions. The fact is that the armed forces long have used this appeal in recruiting—“Join the Army and learn a trade.”

As far as rapid mobilization is concerned, some would emphasize the need for a system of selective service, with the flexibility which would permit great fluctuations in the numbers inducted from one month to another. Some would emphasize the need for building a great reservoir of trained manpower, and keeping the reserve components near full strength. Both points of emphasis fail to take sufficient account of the really critical factor in military mobilization—*matériel* mobilization, that is, providing the facilities and the equipment needed for training as well as for combat operations. Most military authorities would agree that it takes no more than a year to organize and train a division, and the training of replacements during World War I, World War II, and since, has demonstrated that individuals can be trained effectively for modern combat, aside from rated specialties, in 13 to 17 weeks. But the production of

weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and other essential items requires a lead time of 18 to 24 months, or more if new designs are involved.

THE MAJOR ISSUES

Granting the need for maintaining a fairly sizeable military force, a whole series of questions—each potentially a major issue—flows out of the situation. The first question is whether conscription in some form is needed, or whether full reliance can be put upon maintaining the necessary force by volunteers alone. If it is determined that conscription is needed, then the immediate question is what form it should take—selective service, universal military training and service, or a form of national service. A third issue, in some ways the most troublesome of all, pertains to classification and deferment, i.e., the determination of who is available for military service. Fourth is the question whether volunteering should continue along with conscription. The fifth and one of the liveliest issues, is this: If those classified as available for service exceed the number required, then how should the order of call be determined?

In addition, a number of other related questions affect choices of policies for a selective service or other system. These include matters of cost, the need for flexibility, motivation and morale of the forces, and the question of fairness to all individuals.

Strong advocates of doing away with the draft have appeared recently, insisting that volunteering, if made sufficiently attractive, can provide the forces needed. The experience of 1947–1948, when the draft law was allowed to lapse, and recent studies by the Department of Defense, suggest that this is doubtful.

When, in March, 1947, President Truman recommended that the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 be permitted to expire, he did so with a warning that if volunteers did not fill the need for men in the armed forces, he would have to ask for enactment of a new draft law. The total required strength for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force at the time was established at over 2,000,000. But without selective service

their strength fell below 1,400,000 by early 1948. After the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February of that year, President Truman in the next month announced that voluntary enlistments had failed to maintain the armed forces at a strength needed for national safety, and he asked Congress for a revival of the draft. As hearings on the proposal began before congressional committees, the Russians gave a powerful boost with their blockade of Berlin. Approval came in June, 1948, as the Berlin blockade became virtually complete.

A VOLUNTEER ARMY?

At least three studies made in the last two years have arrived independently at the conclusion that voluntary enlistments cannot be relied upon as a satisfactory method to provide the manpower currently needed by the armed forces. Opponents of the draft have suggested that it would be worth the price of granting massive increases in military compensation to attract enough volunteers for all the forces. But the Department of Defense has estimated that the additional cost to recruit and maintain an all-volunteer active force at the pre-Vietnam level of 2,700,000 men would range somewhere between \$4 billion and \$17 billion a year, depending upon employment conditions and other variable factors. Assuming a condition of 4 per cent unemployment, the "best guess" was that the cost would be about \$8 billion a year to attract the necessary number of minimally qualified volunteers. This would not allow for the additional outlays needed to recruit and retain the men needed to maintain the National Guard and the organized Reserves, nor would it cover the cost of recruiting men qualified for advanced technical and professional specialties.

One of the major results of selective service has been its role as an inducement for volunteering. Actually, the draft itself has accounted directly for only about 20 per cent of the men entering the active and reserve forces. But the existence of the draft has been a primary motivation for those who volunteer. In this way, by "getting the jump"

on the draft, men in vulnerable categories have been able to exercise choice in the timing of their induction and in their branch of service. A questionnaire among 59,000 men in active or reserve service in 1964 showed that of 40,000 regular enlisted volunteers who were questioned, 38 per cent said that they would not have volunteered if there had been no draft; 41 per cent of 8,000 first-tour officers gave this reply, and 71 per cent of 11,000 enlisted reservists stated that they would not have enlisted in the absence of a draft.

A further important question relating to the all-volunteer system versus the draft is the matter of quality of manpower. Men with above-average intelligence are the least likely to volunteer, at least during times of less than total mobilization. Draftees provide the major source of men for highly technical enlisted specialties.

Finally, a serious objection to the all-volunteer force is its lack of flexibility. Selective service responds very quickly and closely to variations in requirements—expressed in monthly quotas. A volunteer system alone cannot do that.

QUESTIONS OF FAIRNESS

Now, if it is determined that conscription of some kind is needed, what form should it take? The answer so far has been selective service. When all men available are not needed, selection of those who must serve becomes a matter of primary concern. Factors governing selection may include occupation, education, physical condition, character, marital status, dependents, previous military service and other considerations as well as age. Difficulty arises in establishing acceptable standards of fairness when some have to go to war and others do not. In a situation of total mobilization, where everybody of a given age group who is qualified is taken, the problem of fairness in selection is less acute.

This is a major appeal of universal military training and service, which calls on everyone to serve in peacetime, or during limited war, as well as during an all-out war. This may have the fairness of all-inclusiveness but it begs the question: of those going into the

training program, who goes into further military service? Who must fight in Vietnam? Again, this would be a costly program, and it would tie up a large segment of the regular forces in administering and conducting the training program. Whether the resulting pool of trained manpower would be worth the cost is doubtful. If, as suggested above, men can be trained much more quickly than can equipment be obtained, there is likely to be time for the basic training of recruits while war equipment is being assembled.

An increasing number of persons have been calling for a policy of "national service" in lieu of, or complementary to, military selective service. Detailed suggestions vary, but what the proponents generally have in mind is that everyone should be expected to give one to two years of public service. This might include the armed forces, but it might also include service with the Peace Corps, for example, or with the Public Health Service, or the Environmental Science Services, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or the Immigration Service, or the Forest Service, or the Youth Conservation Corps, or the Teachers Corps, or other agencies of the government. Some proposals would include state and local agencies such as local police forces, conservation bureaus, and welfare agencies in the national service program. Some would include women as well as men. Again, programs of national service would have the advantage of taking everyone who is eligible, but the question of fair distribution would remain. How would it be determined who should go to the Peace Corps, who to the Teachers Corps, and who to the Army in Vietnam?

THE ISSUE OF CLASSIFICATION

Classification is the key to selection under a selective service system, and a great deal of controversy on the current system has centered around the question of deferments. Classification is an attempt to determine who should be available for military service by applying standards of serving the national interest in terms of protecting certain occupations and professions, and by applying standards of fairness to the individual.

Difficult questions arise at every point. From which age groups should servicemen be drawn? Military commanders have generally favored the younger men—the 18- and 19-year olds—as being more susceptible to training. Studies shortly after World War II indicated that on the whole men reach their peak military performance at the age of 25–26; 19-year olds were found to be less stable and to have a greater incidence of delinquency than did men over 20. Older men tend to exercise better judgment, to be less rash (which may or may not be desirable in a soldier), and to have greater stamina. Among men over the age of 30, other problems develop which tend to reduce their military effectiveness. Present policy is to take men between the ages of 18½ and 26, the oldest first. In practice this has meant that in times of low draft calls, the age of the inductee will be relatively higher, and when quotas go up, the average age of those inducted goes down. The median age of all those inducted has been just over 23 years during most of the last ten years, with a high of age 23.7 in fiscal year 1962–63. It fell to age 21.8 in 1965, and has been about age 20 for the last two or three years.

The other side of the coin on age policy is the question of which years are most desirable for military service from the viewpoint of the individual. Many believe that the best time for military training and service is at age 18–20, after graduation from high school but before entering college, technical training or a permanent occupation. Others would prefer to finish college without interruption before going into the armed forces and then, with the benefit of age and experience, to enter graduate school or an occupation immediately upon completion of military service. A few would prefer to complete one to four years of graduate school, and have an advanced degree before going into military service.

Much controversy has developed over the question of deferments—in particular, occupational deferments and student deferments. Which industries, if any, should take priority? Should there be deferment or exemption (ex-

emptions, unlike deferments, do not extend the period of a person's liability for military service) for engineers? Scientists? Teachers? Farmers?

STUDENT DEFERMENTS

Recently there has been a great deal of controversy about student deferments. Many young men, by a combination of educational, occupational and dependency deferments, were able to reach age 26 in a deferred status. Technically, those who had been deferred were liable to call until age 35, but the priority for those over 26 was so low that for practical purposes those who were able to maintain continuous deferments until they had reached the age of 26 had avoided the draft.

On the one hand, there were those who insisted that graduate as well as undergraduate students should be deferred, because these highly educated persons were essential to the nation's economy. Others added that graduate students were essential as instructors in meeting the demands of rapidly rising college enrollments.

On the other hand, there was the argument that there was something basically unfair in giving favored status to those who had the financial resources (or were lucky enough) to keep themselves in college while other men of their age were being called to war. For a time, student deferments put a premium on grades and examinations and this led to further criticism. Finally, the 1967 draft law changed the policy by abolishing deferments for graduate students except for special cases. As a general rule, deferment is to be granted to a person "satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college, university, or similar institution of learning and who requests such deferment." The deferment is to continue until the person "completes the requirements for his baccalaureate degree, fails to pursue satisfactorily a full-time course of instruction, or attains the twenty-fourth anniversary of the date of his birth, whichever first occurs." A student continuing his education in a college or university may be granted a further deferment to the end of the

academic year in which he is enrolled. Similarly, a high school student will be deferred until his graduation, or until he drops out, or until he reaches his twentieth birthday, whichever comes first.

Other deferments—each in itself a subject of controversy or difference of opinion—are provided for fathers, certain government officials, in cases of extreme hardship for dependents, sole surviving sons, ministers and divinity students, certain aliens, and for those deemed unqualified for military service on physical, mental or moral grounds. But all classifications are temporary. The classifications themselves may be redefined, or any change in status, occupation or activity of a person may bring about a change in his selective service classification. An individual may pass into and out of the classification of "available" several times before he reaches the age of 26 or 35 as the case may be.

Another issue relating especially to classification is centralized versus decentralized operation of the system. It has been the policy in the United States since 1917 to depend upon local boards for the classification of persons in their areas. Recently a great deal of criticism has arisen against what is called a lack of uniformity in the operation of selective service. It is said that a person classified I-A by one local board would be deferred by another. But defenders of the current system, while admitting a need for greater uniformity, insist that classification must be in accordance with local conditions, and that strict application of detailed federal regulations throughout would be bound to work hardship and dislocation in local communities.

A particular question which accompanies the operation of a selective service system is whether volunteering should continue at the same time. This is the case currently. Indeed, as noted above, one of the arguments for selective service is that it acts as a major spur for voluntary enlistments. Now, apparently in response to demands for abolishing selective service altogether in favor of a completely voluntary system, government officials and political leaders have been at pains

to emphasize how much of the armed forces is made up of volunteers. The Navy and Marine Corps, traditionally relying for the most part on volunteers, continue to emphasize this. Yet, in a sense, the acceptance of volunteers runs contrary to the whole notion of selective service. This has repercussions both on the make-up of the armed forces and on industry.

After issues have been resolved into a policy for having a system of military conscription, for determining the form it should take, for settling upon deferments and classification, and for the acceptance or nonacceptance of volunteers, the further controversial question remains: what should be the order of call of those declared to be available for military service? During both World War I and World War II this was determined by lot. Since World War II it has been determined by categories, and, within categories, according to age.

A further objection to the current system has been the long period of "exposure" for an individual—the whole time from age 18½ to 26 when educational plans and opportunities for employment remain in some degree of jeopardy while a man remains susceptible to the draft. Moreover, there is disagreement about the "oldest first" policy in the order of calling those available. Here, again, the question arises as to which age group is most desirable for military service, and which is best from the point of view of the individual. A number of critics, while favoring the present system over a lottery, would reverse the age sequences and, perhaps starting at age 19, would take the youngest first. Their contention is that this would be better both for the armed forces and for the individual.

THE LOTTERY

Although the lottery seemed to work well enough during both world wars, those who object to it now do so on grounds of psychological reaction and inflexibility. It is their contention that those whose numbers are drawn early, and who are called for early induction, consider themselves "losers"; this is said to be a poor introduction to military

service. Such an attitude was not noticeable during the world wars, but then there was a general assumption that sooner or later everyone would be called. Now those low on the list—the "winners"—might avoid military service altogether. The question is whether chance of birth is more fair or more desirable. As for flexibility, a lottery should make no difference. Local draft boards put all of their I-A registrants into a sequence for calling, and they dip as low as they must to meet their quotas. The only question is how the listing is determined.

Suggestions and demands for reform or modification of the selective service system became frequent throughout 1967 and 1968. No one was taking the matter more seriously than the Department of Defense. With the benefit of at least three major studies—one completed by the Department itself in June, 1966, a second prepared for the House Armed Services Committee by a panel headed by General Mark Clark which reported in February, 1967, and a third prepared by the National Advisory Committee on Selective Service and presented to the President about the same time—the Department developed a proposal for some basic changes. These were agreed to tentatively by the White House, and in June, 1967, Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) explained the proposed changes to the House Armed Services Committee.

The President had previously sent Congress a message on selective service which stressed a need for improvements in procedures and policies in order (1) to encourage the greatest

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"Environmental pollution control has taken its place among the high-priority domestic problems facing the nation," writes this author, who shows the nature and magnitude of the problems of pollution control.

Environmental Pollution in America

By FRANK A. BUTRICO

Environmental Science Program Coordinator, Battelle Memorial Institute

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION—the unfavorable alteration of our surroundings—and its attendant problems govern the dynamics of the health and the economic and social well-being of man.

Pollution can be considered any form of contamination or adulteration of air, water and land. The concept that noise is also a "pollutant" is gaining wider acceptance and is receiving increasing attention. The magnitude and complexity of the problem of pollution represent a challenge to all segments of society. Improving the quality of the environment requires innovation, bold and imaginative thinking and the development of meaningful and effective action programs. It also requires the understanding and support of the people who, in the final analysis, must decide the quality of the environment in which they live.

Wastes not properly disposed of can adversely alter the physical, chemical and biological characteristics of the air, water and land environments, and the problems created can seriously deplete our natural and material resources. In addition, little is known about the long-range implications of man's exposure to low-dose concentrations of potentially-toxic waste substances—either physiologically or psychologically. Other factors such as efficient land use, accelerating industrial growth, and costs for various alternatives of environmental quality must also be taken into account in developing effective waste management programs.

About 7,300 communities in this country have air pollution problems. Much of this pollution is attributable to the conversion of fossil fuels—petroleum, gas and coal—into energy. Present major pollutants are identified as carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, sulfur and nitrogen oxides, particulates and photochemical smog, thus focusing attention on automobile emissions, the burning of coal and oil, sources of particulate matter, and certain meteorological phenomena. Each day, 90 million motor vehicles are pouring 180,000 tons of carbon monoxide, 33,000 tons of hydrocarbons, and 17,500 tons of nitrogen oxide into the atmosphere, while factories, households, and power plants using fuel oil and coal contribute an additional 100,000 tons or more of sulfur dioxide.

Unless effective corrective measures are initiated soon, the future does not look too promising. It has been estimated that, even if one assumes that 50 per cent of the nation's electric generating capacity will be nuclear-powered by the year 2000, pollutants resulting from fossil fuel generation will double by 1980 and redouble by 2000. We can expect that there will be half again as many automobiles in 1980 and that sulfur dioxide emissions will, by that time, have increased 75 per cent.

An adequate supply of clean water is needed for domestic, agricultural, industrial and recreational uses. Present estimated use in the United States is 355 billion gallons per day. As the economy and population grow,

demands for water of satisfactory quality will increase (the demand has been estimated at 600 billion gallons per day by 1980), requiring more effective means of maintaining water quality. Consequently, special attention must be given to the water cycle, water supply augmentation and water quality management, and to pollution problems.

Better treatment facilities will be needed in the future because water needs will require multiple reuse of water in many parts of the country. Some reuse is occurring, but this cannot be accelerated until more economical, effective, and efficient waste treatment processes are developed.

The main sources of water pollution are organic wastes—those discharged from industrial plants and those of agricultural origin. Other important sources are the inorganic industrial wastes, principally of mineral and chemical origin; synthetic chemical wastes; pesticides; fertilizers; radioactive wastes; and high-temperature waters discharged from power and industrial plants.

A significant pollution problem arises from large quantities of mineral nutrients (coming from sewage, industrial wastes, applied fertilizers, and land drainage) that enter water courses and promote the growth of algae and other plant nuisances. Such growth generally results in a deterioration of water quality, making it unsatisfactory for domestic, industrial, and recreational uses.

Technological advances and the high standard of living have increased the quantity and altered the characteristics of materials being discarded into the environment. Yesterday's garbage and ashes and wastes, largely of a

degradable¹ nature, now include those of a non-degradable nature and special wastes, such as those from nuclear power plants. The average American is responsible for 1,600 pounds of trash per year, while one billion tons of solid wastes are generated on farms and ranches, one billion tons from mining operations, and 15 million tons (6 million units) from scrapped automobiles. Refuse production is believed to be increasing now at about 5 per cent per annum.

Soil pollutants of particular interest are radioactive materials and pesticides. The two important radioactive elements produced in quantity in atomic explosions—Strontium 90 and Cesium 137—are not now a serious hazard to plants and animals, although data is insufficient on long-term exposures and it cannot be concluded that even present levels are not injurious to health.

Pesticides are so widely used today that residues are detectable in many food items and some clothing, in man and animals, and in various parts of our natural surroundings. Their variety, toxicity and persistence are affecting biological systems in nature and human health. While there are many benefits to be derived from the use of these chemicals, we are now beginning to evaluate some of their less obvious effects and potential risks. An estimated 1.25 billion pounds of pesticides were made in the United States in 1966.

Noise is known to cause hearing loss and is believed by some authorities to have more far-reaching effects on humans. The average American is continually exposed to high levels of industrial and aircraft noise, and to a variety of noise-making products, such as automobiles, trucks, sirens and household appliances. There is growing awareness that noise may be an organic health hazard and may have psychological and sociological implications as well.

STUDIES OF THE PROBLEM

More detailed coverage of environmental pollution problems may be found in the reports prepared by "blue ribbon" panels appointed by various government agencies and the National Academy of Sciences.² All are

¹ Chemically and biologically decomposable.

² President's Science Advisory Committee, *Restoring the Quality of our Environment*, Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel (Washington, D.C.: President's Science Advisory Committee, November, 1965); Task Force on Environmental and Related Problems, *A Strategy for a Livable Environment*, Report to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington D.C.: June, 1967); National Academy of Sciences, *Waste Management and Control*, Report to the Federal Council for Science and Technology by the Committee on Pollution, 1966; U.S. Public Health Service, *Report of the Committee on Environmental Health Problems to the Surgeon General* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Public Health Service, November, 1961).

excellent reports on the problems, but each falls short of indicating the solution. The principal reason for this shortcoming may be the lack of full-time attention that members of the special committees can give to a study. All have busy professional schedules and can spend only a limited time thinking through the many facets of the problems. We must develop a method that would enable highly-qualified individuals to take sabbatical leave from their full-time positions and spend sufficient time at a "think tank" facility to develop really meaningful national goals, in-depth action programs and guides for implementation. If this is not done soon, the nation will have ample documentation of its problems but few effective action programs.

The aforementioned reports review in detail a number of broad technical, social, economic and political factors that are important in assessing environmental pollution problems and their solutions. Considered here are some related concepts.

PUBLIC SUPPORT

The citizenry of the nation will have an important voice in deciding the quality of the environment. Pollution abatement will cost money, and the people must pay for it, probably in the form of taxes and higher prices for consumer goods. Decisions must be reached on the use to be made of the environment and on the cost to attain levels of quality permitting such use. It is unrealistic to think of pristine pure air and water and of being able to catch trout from many of our major waterways. Some pollution must be tolerated if we are to enjoy the benefits that come with industrial growth. As stated in the report, *"Waste Management and Control,"* "The right amount of pollution must be planned with criteria set somewhere between the ideal of complete cleanliness and the havoc of uncontrolled filth."

The public must be kept informed if proper choices are to be made and, thanks to the efforts of the news media, the average per-

son is becoming better informed about many facets of the problems. A Harris public opinion poll indicated that 63 per cent of those queried felt some progress, but not enough, has been made in controlling factors of the environment.

There are mixed blessings in this national attention. On the one hand, it has helped to rally support for initiating control programs. On the other, it has given greater responsibility to the pollution control administrators to assess potential hazards properly, and to initiate effective programs. The public is confused by emotional appeals and, in some cases, panic pressure to do something and do it quickly. "Lake Erie is dying" and other such statements about the environment are being made by well-qualified people without supporting data. The public expects the experts to heed the cries for action, and to resist pressures for unplanned or unnecessary action which may look impressive but achieves little.

Statements by well-intentioned people who have appeared before the public and the Congress to "alert" the nation to potential hazards are adding to the confusion. In most cases, they offer limited backup data and inconclusive professional judgment. The professionals have lacked sufficient information to counter the arguments, and have thus been placed on the defensive.

There are also conflicts among the professionals. An example is the situation that developed following publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*.³ Some responsible scientists indicated that the number of deaths caused each year by pesticides is insignificant, smaller than the number caused by aspirin. Others stated that grave consequences could be expected from repeated exposure to concentrations of environmental pollutants such as pesticides.

In the area of water pollution, some experts indicate that phosphates must be removed from waste discharges in order to control algae growths in lakes and streams. An equal number of competent scientists feel that eliminating phosphate discharges to such bodies of water may not alleviate the algae

³ Rachel Carson, *Silent Spring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

problem. There may be other triggering mechanisms. As a result, the public becomes confused; Congress holds fact-finding hearings; and crash programs of questionable effectiveness are initiated.

Some of the changes in the environment appear to go beyond contamination of water, air and land. What, for example, will be the effect on the increased carbon dioxide discharged to the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels, in relation to the absorption of solar energy? What will be the effect on the oxygen supply in our larger cities as grassland and trees which supply oxygen are replaced by pavement? What changes may take place in aquatic biota if waters are transferred between basins or if waters from Canada and Alaska are brought to areas of water shortage in the United States? What are the effects of thermal pollution on aquatic biota? These and other ecological problems need searching inquiry.

INFORMATION ANALYSIS CENTERS

Information analysis centers and early warning systems oriented to environmental pollution are needed. The output from such centers would permit better scientific evaluations and threat identification, and hopefully would help those concerned with environmental quality control to react to problems before they become crises. Insight, backed up by scientific data, is needed to anticipate problems and to initiate control programs before the problems reach critical proportions. The Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development of the Committee on Science

and Astronautics, in the House of Representatives, put it this way: "We can no longer blindly adapt technology to our needs without making allowances in advance for the serious side effects which such technology may carry with it."⁴

To be effective, information analysis-early warning systems should include data on the complete cycle of contaminants—physical, chemical and biological—from primary source, through usage pattern, losses and final application and disposal. In addition, the systems should be designed to permit assessment of health hazards.

We are approaching an era of ecological management which will present an opportunity to eliminate environmental pollution mistakes by applying every skill at our disposal. Total waste management should consider, in a quantitative manner, the effects of the waste material or the corrective action upon the flora and fauna involved, including man. It is also necessary to be able to predict the transport of the waste material throughout the ecological system, thereby identifying the points—either biological or physical—where the waste matter or components of it might accumulate and lead to problems. We are now able to develop quantitative, predictive, simulation models of these situations.

We must also look at total man and his total environment.⁵ The hazards we seek to prevent or control do not necessarily assert themselves as "single agent insults." We need to consider the total combined effect of our modern environment on man, to assess the impact of contaminants associated with air, water, food and soil, along with the social, the physiological and the economic factors involved.

One way of doing this is by systems analysis. This approach permits us to look at problems in totality—to examine a total complex and interrelate all its demographic, economic, social and physical factors. Systems analysis involves weighing all possible alternative solutions with respect to their costs and predicted consequences, and selecting preferred solutions based on this information.

⁴ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, "The Adequacy of Technology for Pollution Abatement," *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development*, July, August, September, 1966; see also "Environmental Pollution: A Challenge to Science and Technology," *Report of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development to the Committee on Science and Astronautics*, October, 1966.

⁵ National Sanitation Foundation, *Man Versus Environment—The Dynamic Spectrum: Man, Health and Environment*, Final Report of a Research Project (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The National Sanitation Foundation, October, 1966); René Dubos, *Man and His Environment, Biomedical Knowledge and Social Action*, first in the series of PAHO/WHO Scientific Lectures, Scientific Publication No. 131, March, 1966.

Prediction of present and future consequences of action programs can be included in the analysis. This is important in analyzing environmental pollution problems in order to minimize initiating costly control measures that may soon be inadequate.

EFFECTS ON MAN

While much attention is being directed to the physical problems of the environment, little is known about the effect of contaminants on biological systems. It will not be possible to anticipate and visualize the harmful potentialities of environmental contaminants⁶ until there is a comprehensive understanding of the role of the normal elements and the components of living organisms. Life scientists must work to develop quick response "tests" that would indicate physiological changes resulting from man's exposure to various environmental insults—particularly those suspected of causing changes after long-term exposure at low-dose concentrations. It is probable that a great variety of delayed pathological manifestations may result, which will not be detected at the time of exposure but may become evident several decades later.

Considerable attention is being given to the quality of the American environment and there are indications that control programs may be more closely oriented to consumer protection. Standards for environmental quality will be established and greater emphasis will be placed on enforcement as a control device.

In setting standards, a number of pertinent issues can be raised. How much scientific information is available on which to base definitive limits of environmental quality? Each factor of the environment—air, water, solid wastes, and so forth—has, for the most part, been considered separately when, in reality, the extent and nature of the entire interrelationship should be considered. So-

ciety can then decide what kind of environment it wants and is willing to pay for. Considering all these factors, it is important that established standards be flexible because they will be subject to adjustment as situations and new information dictate. New knowledge and technologies must be developed to provide the data on which to base agreements and decisions. Research organizations, private and public, must develop the data and work with control and regulatory agencies in putting their findings into practice. It is imperative that we shorten the gap between research findings and their practical applications.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

To assure maximum results from applied research studies in the shortest possible time, emphasis must be placed on high-priority targeted projects. Maximum utilization must be made of all available resources—those at universities as well as industrial and independent research laboratories. The development of the sciences undergirding the technology and the applied sciences specific to a particular problem and the technical application of both to problem-solving require a cooperative effort among each of these groups and call for well-targeted program objectives by those supporting research. It will require close working arrangements among the universities that are oriented to developing the basic sciences information and the "mission-oriented" applied scientists usually found in the independent and industrial research laboratories.

The mention of research is not intended to support delay in initiating action programs until all the answers are developed by the scientists. Every effort should be made to apply available knowledge immediately, but applied research studies and demonstration projects should be undertaken concurrently, so that new approaches and advanced methodology will be ready for use when needed. The need will surely arise as pollution problems become more complex and as standards of environmental quality are raised.

With the volume of waste products increas-

⁶ Frank A. Butrico, *Early Warning Systems Concerned with Environmental Contaminants*, a paper presented at the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association and meetings of Related Organizations, Miami Beach, Florida, October, 1967.

ing at a phenomenal rate, some of the research and development efforts that industry now focuses on the manufacture and sale of products should be directed to the ultimate disposal of certain products. The added costs, passed on to the consumer, will be more than offset by the saving to the public in the final disposal of the product. Degradable containers, nutrient-free detergents, and automobiles designed so that metallic components can be easily separated for reduction and reuse, are examples. In brief, work must be started towards closing the resource-use-resource-reuse loop.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Pollution control requires collaboration at all levels of government, including both public and private institutions.

Many communities today are exceeding their debt limit and cannot finance the construction of such facilities, even with federal and state contributions. The situation is not promising for those dependent upon this support. Present world tensions will probably reduce still further the federal construction grant budget which is currently about half the amount authorized by the Congress. While some states are planning to proceed without full federal participation, the overall impact will not be significant unless private financing is also considered. This is possible if new regional authorities or agencies are established with broader authority than is now reposed in agencies oriented only to regulatory planning functions. Such institutional arrangements should include the authority to finance, design, construct and operate treatment facilities that could not or would not be undertaken by other government units or private enterprise. Projects would be privately financed and paid for by the users through some equitable charges. An example of this is the recently-created Ohio Water Development Authority that is now planning the financing of pollution abatement facilities in the five major river

basins in Ohio. A desirable provision in the law permits the Authority to consider projects for industrial and municipal waste treatment facilities.

TAX CREDIT

The costs for abating pollution are high. It is estimated that these may run as much as \$10 billion each year for the next 10 to 20 years. Since improvements at one location frequently benefit others elsewhere, pollution abatement costs, in many instances, should be considered "social costs," with much of the funding coming from government sources at all levels. However, since some of the costs of controlling pollution, as well as the benefits, must be shared by industry, some form of tax benefits must be enacted. Currently, industry is spending between \$0.5 and \$1 billion annually on pollution abatement, and the costs will increase significantly in the next ten years.⁷ To offset some of the high costs, the states and the federal government should provide some tax incentives in the form of tax write-offs and credits for pollution control equipment and facilities.

Environmental pollution control has taken its place among the high-priority domestic problems facing the nation. While the magnitude of the problem cannot yet be fully assessed, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that man is so severely altering the ecological balance that natural pollution reservoirs and self-restoring processes are being destroyed. To prevent irreversible damage we must initiate effective waste management programs and use systems analysis to study

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Frank A. Butrico was chief of the Public Health Service's Office of Resources Development, concerned with various aspects of environmental health. In 1960 and 1961, he served as executive secretary of the first national conference on water pollution. He is the author of more than 40 papers on the health aspects of nuclear energy, on water pollution control research and on manpower needs in sanitation and environmental health.

⁷ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, "The Adequacy of Technology for Pollution Abatement," *op. cit.*

"... while improvement of laws and law enforcement are crucial, they will not be sufficiently effective unless we treat the basic social and economic causes of crime," writes this specialist, who warns that "Whether or not the threat of violence deters, it is clear that the use of violence in the control of violence escalates the degree of damage."

Crime And Violence In American Life

BY ROBERT K. WOETZEL

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ACCORDING TO THE UNIFORM crime report released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in June, 1968, there was a 17 per cent increase in serious crime in the United States during the first three months of 1968, compared to the first three months of 1967. While the population of the nation has increased by 10 per cent since 1960, crime has increased by 88 per cent. The Senate Judiciary Committee has stated that "Crime is the most critical and urgent problem facing the nation," and Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas has commented that "Crime and the threat of crime stalk America. Our streets are unsafe. Our citizens are fearful, terrorized and outraged."

A recent survey in high-crime areas of two major cities showed that 43 per cent of those interviewed stayed off the streets at night, 35 per cent did not speak to strangers, 21 per cent used only cabs and cars at night and 20 per cent wanted to move to another neighborhood because of fear. The federal government has authorized its employees doing overtime work to receive cab fare home because women employees are afraid to walk the streets of Washington after dark.

The F.B.I. reports that crimes of violence climbed 18 per cent during the first quarter of 1968, with murder up 16 per cent, forcible rape, 19 per cent, aggravated assault, 13 per cent, and robbery, 24 per cent. Armed robbery rose 26 per cent, and aggravated assault

with a firearm increased 23 per cent. With more than 20 million citizens owning more than 100 million firearms, about 17,000 gun-shot deaths are reported every year.

Youth in ferment has been charged with a lion's share of crime: 75 per cent of all arrests for major crimes are arrests of juveniles between the ages of 11 and 24. Although racial minorities show a higher incidence of crime than does the more affluent white majority, increases of crime in affluent white suburbia have also been noted.

Crime and violence must be considered in the light of the American way of life. The bloodstained histories of Al Capone, "Lucky," Luciano and other underworld figures are paralleled by the activities of America's frontier "heroes" like Jesse James and by moguls of the period of industrial expansion like Edward H. Harriman, who instigated the railroad wars in the state of New York. Movies have glorified many of these exploits. Violence is part of the daily fare of television programs and, indeed, has had a fascination for generations of Americans.

COMPLEX CAUSES OF VIOLENCE

The complexity of the violence syndrome mirrors the complex causes of violence in America today.

Changing social patterns in the second half of the twentieth century in America have produced a lack of stability which has given

rise to some violent challenges to authority. Thus increases in ordinary crimes in the United States have been linked to civil disorders. Historically, Americans have defended violence when necessary to overthrow tyranny—witness the Declaration of Independence. But whether or not a particular government or governmental action should be regarded as tyrannical defies objective definition.

In the United States, conflicts between state and federal sovereignties and state and federal laws confuse the issue of legality and lead well-meaning citizens to defy unpalatable laws. Challenges to particular laws—federal or state—may be regarded as testing the laws, and may, in the process, lead to violence.

In the presence of overwhelming need for social change and in the absence of consensus and of effective mechanisms for change, violence and counterviolence may be regarded by their advocates as legitimate. This was the genesis of the rise of the Ku Klux Klan during the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, and is in fact at the root of the Black Power movement today.

Members of various militant activist groups spanning the political spectrum from left to right argue their causes in moral terms. The John Birch Society defends violations of individual rights as necessary for the common good. Members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee argue that force may be necessary to remove the evil byproducts of a system they despise. The Students for a Democratic Society resort to violence to defend their rights against the so-called establishment.

Extremists have argued that burning down a ghetto is constructive in that it destroys inadequate housing and makes way for better facilities. The students who seized buildings at Columbia University argued that ordinary appeals had gone unanswered and that they were forced into action to move the so-called power structure to negotiate long-standing grievances. Nevertheless, the actions of extremists have violated the rights of those who lived in destroyed ghetto housing, and

the rights of students who wanted to continue attending classes. The tyranny of the majority in many instances has been matched by the tyranny of a minority.

Violence tends to evoke counterviolence, which causes further violence. The threat of force may in some instances act as a deterrent to violence, but only the selective enforcement of law can avoid indiscriminate response. Often, nonselective, generalized violence by students or racial groups intensifies hostility and gives rise to nonselective counterviolence.

Police actions on the Columbia University campus in the spring of 1968, when one thousand policemen fought with 800 students, indicate a lack of discrimination. Similarly, during the racial riots of the summer of 1967, police and national guardsmen overreacted, failing to distinguish between hostile and peaceful keynoters when the latter might have helped to disperse the crowds.

The murder of President John F. Kennedy offered a classic drama of violence and counterviolence, when the police did not adequately protect the alleged assassin.

Police brutality in law enforcement and in jails adds to the level of violence. The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., was preceded by attacks against other civil rights workers and the murder of three of them by—among others—law enforcement officers in the state of Mississippi. Law enforcement officers the country over have been known to arrogate to themselves the extra-judicial role of meting out punishment for crimes which they believe will not be penalized sufficiently by the courts. The comment of a Detroit policeman to a Negro who had allegedly insulted him—that he might not be able to kill him but would come close to it, and his subsequent clubbing of the Negro in front of the television cameras—is an illustration of this attitude.

The psychological factor in generating violence may be as important as any other in understanding the syndrome. Verbal violence and character assassination usually precede physical violence.

There is also a double standard of behavior in American life today, and dissatisfaction

with the double standard may breed violence. There is, first of all, an official and an unofficial America. When we speak of the American way of life we are generally referring to the official system, but the unofficial system—which consists, among other groups—of criminal underworld syndicates—may be more powerful. In the case of organized crime, for example, the official America tends to ignore its unofficial counterpart.

The official America—the so-called Power Structure or Establishment—is being challenged by many young people today, by Black Americans, and by many Americans of all ages and colors living at or below the poverty line in the midst of American affluence. The Establishment, which ignores the unofficial world of organized crime and which perpetuates a double standard, may question the patriotism, moral fiber and will to work of the challengers, but the challenges arise because of social ills.

Crime and violence also result from a lack of integration in the community. A sense of responsibility requires a share of responsibility. When persons or groups are not integrated into the community, they find it difficult to identify with the community. The urban crisis is a crisis of identity. Alienation results when persons are rejected or excluded, and the results of alienation range from insanity to crime.

Cities with a population of less than 100,000 often have a common basis of livelihood which connects people and shapes common attitudes. Dependence on a business concern which is the sole economic provider can breed loyalties and influence value standards. Cities with populations between 100,000 and 500,000 are less monolithic and are probably most comfortable for emerging minority groups. Cities with populations of more than 500,000 are generally subject to the stresses and strains of underintegration. Contacts between groups tend to break down. Power structures seem almost irrelevant in this process as people become alienated from each other and from the society they live in.

In Cleveland, where a Negro mayor embodies the aspirations of certain minority

groups, the alienation is felt in white circles and the distance between the mayor's office and the people is the same as elsewhere. So are the problems.

In Chicago, where the enlightened Model Penal Code of Illinois is the basis of law enforcement, threats and counter-threats are traded by the mayor and certain dissident groups as they are in Boston with a draconic and ancient legal system. In New York City, law enforcement and city government have come to terms with extra-legal forces and a kind of *modus vivendi* between the official and unofficial America has been worked out. In Los Angeles, protection of vested interests is attempted by suppressing dissent, which produces a vicious circle of violence and reaction.

TOWARD REDUCING VIOLENCE

As the level of violence in the United States rises, efforts are under way to find new methods of reducing the violence and countering crime. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides \$400,111,000 to upgrade law enforcement and includes minimal new federal gun controls—the first to be enacted since 1938. If one regards the system to be protected as legitimate, more efficient law enforcement should be provided to diminish violence.

In addition to more effective law enforcement, it has been argued, certain individual rights must be suspended or curtailed in order to counter criminal activity. Thus the 1968 anticrime bill authorizes wiretaps and electronic eavesdropping in the investigation of major crimes when authorized in advance by a court. In this case, the right of privacy is balanced against considerations of national security.

Various gun control bills have been introduced into Congress and into state legislatures in an effort to reduce violence. Gun control legislation which will make it easier for the authorities to trace a culprit is helpful in law enforcement although law cannot eliminate the irrational responses of potential killers. Weapons have been easily available throughout the nation in the past. Elimination

nating the atmosphere of violence may be more significant in treating crime.

It has been claimed that the presence of potential illegal or legal counterviolence may be the best preventive of actual violence. In the 1966 disorders among rival gangs in Brooklyn, New York, the Gallo brothers—one of the most feared underworld groups—were asked to mediate. In 1965, in California, antiwar protesters were confronted with Hells Angels, known for their violence.

Within a legal framework, Philadelphia, which had a serious riot some time ago under a progressive administration, has had no recent disorder under a police chief known to be a draconian enforcer. On the other hand, under a professorial police chief, Chicago has been threatened with disorder time and again. Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago recently indicated that when provoked, his police would “shoot to kill.” Mayor John Lindsay of New York disagreed with Mayor Daley, but asked the City Council for emergency powers for his police.

Whether or not the threat of violence deters, it is clear that the use of violence in the control of violence escalates the degree of damage. Militants in minority groups and youthful protesters arm themselves so that they can threaten violence in case they are attacked by police. Official and unofficial violence creates an atmosphere in which criminals can loot, kill and generally terrorize the population. The challenge to authority on the one hand, and the protection of authority on the other, often leave the individual defenseless. The struggle for power engages more resources than the protection of citizens.

Finally, crime requires self-analysis; a look at ourselves and our standards is essential. Certain actions involving personal relationships, for examples, may not even be crimes according to the general standards of conduct recognized by the civilized nations. Criminal laws dealing with such behavior—laws which are not enforced—tend to diminish the stature of the law. So do so-called “blotter arrests,” which are without substance but which may spoil a citizen’s record.

Furthermore, law enforcers should be held responsible to the law just as law violators are held, if the law is to command respect.

But while improvement of laws and law enforcement are crucial, they will not be sufficiently effective unless we treat the basic social and economic causes of crime. Anti-poverty programs may help eliminate the conditions that breed crime. Jobs may give people a sense of belonging in society. Yet there must be an environment to encourage self-respect. The technological civilization with its impersonality in which the individual feels lost must not expand further.

The larger cities of the nation may very well consider a certain decentralization, establishing neighborhood forms of government. Police methods and other mechanics of governing could then be determined by groups which have certain characteristics in common—racial, social or economic. In our interdependent society, these units could be related to one another through various coordinating bodies; intervention might take place if rights were being violated. But the bases of control would be neighborhood units which would reflect the aspirations of their inhabitants. The same practice could be applied to universities and to large corporations. A greater sense of participation would rid individuals of the feeling that they are being exploited and dictated to and would thereby diminish the type of crime that is due to rebellion.

In the last analysis, real authority must rest on voluntary law abidance. The integration of varied groups may lead to a revitalization of American democracy.

Robert Woetzel is engaged in a research project on organized crime. He was a member of the first National Conference on Crime Control called by President Johnson in 1967. He formerly served as Director of the Ford Fund for Public Affairs Research Project on Organized Crime at New York University and has written on domestic and international criminal law. Mr. Woetzel is Secretary-General of the International Criminal Law Commission.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE WORLD OF GOLD. By TIMOTHY GREEN. (New York: Walker, 1968. 229 pages, charts, bibliography and index, \$5.95.)

A former London correspondent for numerous magazines and newspapers, Timothy Green writes clearly and interestingly on the complex world of international finance. Here financiers appear as human beings, and both their motivations and their actions are described lucidly. In the words of a Swiss banker quoted by Green, "You can't sweep gold under the carpet, it keeps on cropping up." This being the case, it is pleasant to have so readable and accurate an account.

O.E.S.

THE BIGGEST JOB IN THE WORLD: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY. By FRED REINFELD. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1968. 172 pages and index, \$.75.)

This paperback reissue of an earlier edition devotes approximately half its pages to an overview of the powers and duties of the President, the rest to discussion of some precedent-making presidential acts. The treatment is necessarily brief and episodic, but the examples are fresh and the writing is competent.

O.E.S.

DELINQUENCY AND CRIME: CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES. By RUTH and JORDAN CAVAN. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968. 233 pages and index, \$5.95.)

Delinquent and criminal behavior in various countries of Europe, Asia and North America, in urban and rural societies, are reported. Based on published studies and official documents, this is a brief survey but useful as an introduction to the subject.

O.E.S.

POVERTY AS A PUBLIC ISSUE. Edited by BEN B. SELIGMAN. (New York: The Free Press, 1965. 354 pages and index, \$5.95.)

All the aspects of rural and urban poverty—youth and age, employment, consumption and political maneuvering—are discussed by 15 experts in the field. The origins, scope and future outlook of this problem are revealed in all their complexity and urgency. This compact survey should be read by all politicians, students and citizens if we are to reach agreement on rational solutions to this pressing crisis.

O.E.S.

THE FACES OF POWER: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO JOHNSON. By SEYOM BROWN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 372 pages and index, \$8.95.)

In this scholarly analysis of 20 years of American foreign policy, Seyom Brown finds unchanging basic premises of official policy formulation. The changes come in response to external shifts—in opponents, goals and methods—rather than in response to domestic shifts in purpose. The major part of the book examines in some detail the foreign policy challenges and changes during the administrations of Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy-Lyndon Johnson.

O.E.S.

THE DEGENERATION OF OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: AN AMERICAN TRADITION IN TROUBLE. By JULES ABELS. (New York: Macmillan, 1968. 306 pages and index, \$6.95.)

Jules Abels rains shrewd and telling blows on inflated campaign oratory, po-

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Democratic and Republican Platform Planks

The planks of the Democratic and Republican party platforms adopted at their national conventions provide a basis for comparison of the two parties on vital issues. These paraphrased excerpts are taken from the platforms adopted by the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach on August 5, 1968, and by the Democratic National Convention in Chicago on August 28, 1968.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

THE CITIES

[We pledge:]

To be guided by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concerning jobs, housing, urban renewal and education; to foster an independent citizenry through a dynamic economy; cooperation among all levels of government and private agencies.

JUSTICE AND LAW

Equal justice under law shall be denied to no one. Increase in the numbers, pay and training of police; improvement of criminal court procedures; rehabilitation of convicted offenders; new efforts to combat organized crime; improvement of relations between police and community.

ECONOMY

Economic growth is the first anti-poverty program; the assurance that every American of every race, in every region, will truly share in the benefits of economic progress; the mobilization of private enterprise to work with the people to improve the lives of the poor.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

CITIES CRISIS

[We pledge:]

A vigorous effort to encourage state and local efforts to transform the cities; a more expanded involvement of private capital; and a complete overhaul of jumbled federal programs.

CRIME

Improved support of law enforcement agencies and a vigorous drive against drugs and narcotics. Total commitment to the war against organized crime; the use of court-supervised wiretapping procedures and eavesdropping. Support of gun control provided that the legitimate acquisition and use of guns are not impaired.

ECONOMY

Promotion of fiscal integrity; an attack on inflation; the promotion of growth through sound monetary policies; a restraint on government interference with the economy, and the balanced use of savings (from the cessation of the Vietnamese War) for tax reductions and domestic needs.

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Report to the President on Rural Poverty

On September 27, 1966, President Johnson instructed the National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty to study the conditions of rural life in the United States, to evaluate existing policies and to develop recommendations for action. The Commission's official summary of its conclusions and recommendations, made public in 1967, follows:

This report is about a problem which many in the United States do not realize exists. The problem is rural poverty. It affects some 14 million Americans. Rural poverty is so widespread, and so acute, as to be a national disgrace, and its consequences have swept into our cities, violently.

The urban riots during 1967 had their roots, in considerable part, in rural poverty. A high proportion of the people crowded into city slums today came there from rural slums. This fact alone makes clear how large a stake the people of this nation have in an attack on rural poverty.

The total number of rural poor would be even larger than 14 million had not so many of them moved to the city. They made the move because they wanted a job and a decent place to live. Some have found them. Many have not. Many merely exchanged life in a rural slum for life in an urban slum, at exorbitant cost to themselves, to the cities, and to rural America as well.

Even so, few migrants have returned to the rural areas they left. They have apparently concluded that bad as conditions are in an urban slum, they are worse in the rural slum they fled from. There is evidence in the pages of this report to support their conclusion.

This Nation has been largely oblivious to these 14 million impoverished people left behind in rural America. Our programs for rural America are woefully out of date.

Some of our rural programs, especially farm and vocational agriculture programs, are relics from an earlier era. They were developed in a period during which the welfare of farm families was equated with the well-being of rural communities and of all rural people. This no longer is so.

They were developed without anticipating the vast changes in technology, and the consequences of this technology to rural people. Instead of combating low incomes of rural people, these programs have helped to create wealthy landowners while largely bypassing the rural poor.

Most rural programs still do not take the speed and consequences of technological change into account. We have not yet adjusted to the fact that in the brief period of 15 years, from 1950 to

1965, new machines and new methods increased farm output in the United States by 45 percent—and reduced farm employment by 45 percent. Nor is there adequate awareness that during the next 15 years the need for farm labor will decline by another 45 percent. Changes like these on the farm are paralleled on a broader front throughout rural America, affecting many activities other than farming and touching many more rural people than those on farms.

In contrast to the urban poor, the rural poor, notably the white, are not well organized, and have few spokesmen for bringing the Nation's attention to their problems. The more vocal and better organized urban poor gain most of the benefits of current antipoverty programs.

Until the past few years, the Nation's major social welfare and labor legislation largely bypassed rural Americans, especially farmers and farmworkers. Farm people were excluded from the Social Security Act until the mid-1950's. Farmers, farmworkers, and workers in agriculturally related occupations are still excluded from other major labor legislation, including the unemployment insurance programs, the Labor-Management Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and most State workman's compensation acts.

Because we have been oblivious of the rural poor, we have abetted both rural and urban poverty, for the two are closely linked through migration. The hour is late for taking a close look at rural poverty, gaining an understanding of its consequences, and developing programs for doing something about it. The Commission is unanimous in the conviction that effective programs for solving the problems of rural poverty will contribute to the solution of urban poverty as well.

The facts of rural poverty are given in detail later in this report. They are summarized in the paragraphs that follow.

Rural poverty in the United States has no geographic boundaries. It is acute in the South, but it is present and serious in the East, the West, and the North. Rural poverty is not limited to Negroes. It permeates all races and ethnic groups. Nor is poverty limited to the farm. Our

farm population has declined until it is only a small fraction of our total rural population. Most of the rural poor do not live on farms. They live in the open country, in rural villages, and in small towns. Moreover, contrary to a common misconception, whites out-number nonwhites among the rural poor by a wide margin. It is true, however, that an extremely high proportion of Negroes in the rural South and Indians on reservations are destitute.

Hunger, even among children, does exist among the rural poor, as a group of physicians discovered recently in a visit to the rural South. They found Negro children not getting enough food to sustain life, and so disease ridden as to be beyond cure. Malnutrition is even more widespread. The evidence appears in bad diets and in diseases which often are a product of bad diets.

Disease and premature death are startlingly high among the rural poor. Infant mortality, for instance, is far higher among the rural poor than among the least privileged group in urban areas. Chronic diseases also are common among both young and old. And medical and dental care is conspicuously absent.

Unemployment and underemployment are major problems in rural America. The rate of unemployment nationally is about 4 percent. The rate in rural areas averages about 18 percent. Among farmworkers, a recent study discovered that underemployment runs as high as 37 percent.

The rural poor have gone, and now go, to poor schools. One result is that more than 3 million rural adults are classified as illiterates. In both educational facilities and opportunities, the rural poor have been shortchanged.

Most of the rural poor live in atrocious houses. One in every 13 houses in rural America is officially classified as unfit to live in.

Many of the rural poor live in chronically depressed poverty-stricken rural communities. Most of the rural South is one vast poverty area. Indian reservations contain heavy concentrations of poverty. But there also are impoverished rural communities in the upper Great Lakes region, in New England, in Appalachia, in the Southwest, and in other sections.

The community in rural poverty areas has all but disappeared as an effective institution. In the past the rural community performed the services needed by farmers and other rural people. Technological progress brought sharp declines in the manpower needs of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining. Other industries have not replaced the jobs lost, and they have supplied too few jobs for the young entries in the labor market. Larger towns and cities have taken over many of the economic and social functions of the villages and small towns.

The changes in rural America have rendered obsolete many of the political boundaries to villages and counties. Thus these units operate on too small a scale to be practicable. Their tax base has eroded as their more able-bodied wage earners left for jobs elsewhere. In consequence the public services in the typical poor rural community are grossly inadequate in number, magnitude, and quality. Local government is no longer able to cope with local needs.

As the communities ran downhill, they offered fewer and fewer opportunities for anyone to earn a living. The inadequately equipped young people left in search of better opportunities elsewhere. Those remaining behind have few resources with which to earn incomes adequate for a decent living and for revitalizing their communities.

For all practical purposes, then, most of the 14 million people in our poverty areas are outside our market economy. So far as they are concerned, the dramatic economic growth of the United States might as well never have happened. It has brought them few rewards. They are on the outside looking in, and they need help.

Congress and State legislatures from time to time have enacted many laws and appropriated large sums of money to aid the poverty stricken and to help rural America. Very little of the legislation or the money has helped the rural poor. Major farm legislation directed at commercial farms has been successful in helping farmers adjust supply to demand, but it has not helped farmers whose production is very small. And because the major social welfare and labor legislation has discriminated against rural people, many of the rural poor—farmers and farmworkers particularly—have been denied unemployment insurance, denied the right of collective bargaining, and denied the protection of workman's compensation laws.

This Commission questions the wisdom of massive public efforts to improve the lot of the poor in our central cities without comparable efforts to meet the needs of the poor in rural America. Unfortunately, as public programs improve the lot of the urban poor, without making similar improvements in conditions for the rural poor, they provide fresh incentive for the rural poor to migrate to the central cities. The only solution is a coordinated attack on both urban and rural poverty.

The Commission has endeavored to chart a course to wipe out rural poverty. Emphasis has been placed on the problems of poor rural people, and problems of impoverished rural communities. Changes in existing programs and the development of new programs are considered. Action on the immediate needs of the rural poor is empha-

sized, as well as action to change the conditions which make them poor. Human development and the physical resources needed for this development are stressed. Improving the operation of the private economy in order to provide rural people with better opportunities for jobs and a decent living is emphasized.

It is the firm conviction of the Commission that the complexity of the problems of rural poverty precludes the success of a single program or approach. Programs addressed to immediate needs will not erase the underlying conditions creating and perpetuating rural poverty. Programs addressed to these conditions will not immediately help the poor. The Commission's recommendations complement and reinforce one another. In total, the recommendations will go far to solve the problems of rural poverty.

The Commission is convinced that the abolition of rural poverty in the United States, perhaps for the first time in any nation, is completely feasible. The nation has the economic resources and the technical means for doing this. What it has lacked, thus far, has been the will. The Commission rejects the view that poverty, in so rich a nation, is inevitable for any large group of its citizens.

Elsewhere in this report there appear the recommendations of the Commission in detail. These recommendations call for action by all branches of government—local, State, and Federal—as well as by private individuals and groups. The major thrust of the recommendations is discussed briefly in the paragraphs that follow.

(1) The Commission recommends that the United States adopt and put into effect immediately a national policy designed to give the residents of rural America equality of opportunity with all other citizens. This must include equal access to jobs, medical care, housing, education, welfare, and all other public services, without regard to race, religion, or place of residence.

(2) The Commission recommends, as a matter of urgency, that the national policy of full employment, inaugurated in 1946, be made effective. The need is even greater in rural areas than in urban areas. The Commission urges that this need be given priority in legislation and appropriations. To the extent that private enterprise does not provide sufficient employment for all those willing and able to work, the Commission believes it is the obligation of government to provide it.

(3) The Commission believes that the United States has the resources and the technical means to assure every person in the United States adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and education and, accordingly, recommends action toward this end. Millions of rural residents today are denied the opportunity of earning a

living. The Commission believes it is the obligation of society and of government, to assure such people enough income to provide a decent living. In order to achieve this, basic changes are recommended in public assistance programs.

In some rural areas of the United States there is not only malnutrition but hunger. Existing public programs for food distribution to those in need have failed to meet the need. The Commission recommends that the food stamp program be expanded nationwide and that eligibility be based upon per capita income. Food stamps should be given to the poorest of the poor without cost.

(4) The Commission recommends a thorough overhauling of our manpower policies and programs, particularly including public employment services, in order to deal effectively with rural unemployment and underemployment. The Commission deplors the fact that the richest, most powerful nation in history compels millions of its citizens to engage in aimless wandering in search of jobs and places to live. The recommendations of the Commission aim at a comprehensive and active manpower program which can be an effective weapon against poverty.

(5) The Commission recommends extensive changes in our rural education system, ranging from preschool programs to adult education. Rural schools must be brought up to par with urban schools. The educational system must reclaim youth and adults who drop out before obtaining sufficient education to cope with the complexities of today's world. An educational extension service is recommended to help teachers and schools meet the needs of all students.

(6) The Commission is deeply concerned at the evidence of disease and the lack of medical care in rural areas. The Commission, therefore, recommends rapid expansion of health manpower—both professional and subprofessional—in rural areas, and the establishment of Community Health Centers which can focus on the health needs of rural people.

(7) The Commission recommends development and expansion of family planning programs for the rural poor. Low income families are burdened with relatively numerous children to feed, clothe, and house. They are prepared psychologically to accept family planning. As a matter of principle, they are entitled to facilities and services to help them plan the number and spacing of their children.

(8) The Commission recommends immediate action to provide housing in rural areas by public agencies and puts special emphasis on a program providing rent supplements for the rural poor.

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AMERICAN POVERTY

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If some economists are right in contending that existing unemployment, which is rather low, is really hard-core, afflicting mainly Negroes and youth, the technologically displaced, and the unretired aged, then the guaranteed-income plan may very well be the sole method for absorbing these groups into the larger society. The cost of bringing them up to a \$3,000-a-year level would be some \$11 billion or \$12 billion a year, substantially less than 2 per cent of the GNP.

THE NEGATIVE INCOME TAX

The negative income tax idea was broached in 1962 by Milton Friedman, a conservative economist who was one of Barry Goldwater's advisers in the 1964 Presidential campaign. Professor Friedman was mainly concerned with abolishing Social Security, such categorical assistance as aid to dependent children, public housing and the like. For him, the negative income tax was a device to get the federal government out of the economic arena.

It is one of history's minor ironies that his notion, applied in a limited manner, offers a radical solution for some of our more pressing problems—those stemming from poverty and technology. Supporters of the Ad Hoc Committee statement do not find the Friedman idea unwelcome.

In any case, the negative income tax has received a fair measure of attention in recent months. According to reports, even President Johnson is not entirely averse to it. The proposal has been considered by the Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisers (C.E.A.), and it is now being advocated by Professor James Tobin of Yale, a former member of the C.E.A. For the fact is that tax cuts of the sort promulgated in 1964 do not help the poor, who generally pay no taxes at all. In effect, the negative tax would be akin to a refund payment, except that nothing would have been paid to the government in the first instance.

The scheme, of course, poses some difficult administrative questions, for it would be up to the beneficiary to apply for his subsidy. Most of those lacking previous contact with the Internal Revenue Service would not have the foggiest notion of how to get their "negative refunds." An extensive effort by the government would be required in order to make all the payments.

Robert Lampman, in a study made for the Office of Economic Opportunity, suggested one subsidy scale that ranges from \$1,500 (half the poverty threshold) for a family earning nothing to a zero subsidy when the family income is \$3,000. For example, with an earned income of \$500 a year, there would be a gap of \$2,500 between the actual income and the poverty standard of \$3,000. In such a situation, Lampman suggests a "negative tax" rate of 45 per cent, giving a subsidy of \$1,125 for a total income of \$1,625. If the family's earnings were \$2,000—leaving a poverty gap of \$1,000—a negative tax rate of 25 per cent would add additional income of \$250.

Of course, the subsidy rates are arbitrary and would be decided upon by legislative consensus. In any case, an incentive would be given for, with actual earnings, the family is brought closer and closer to the cutoff line. In short, the scheme would provide additional income to fill the gap between actual earnings and some defined minimum income level.

Tobin's scheme is more involved: a subsidy would be given for each member of a household and then reduced by one-third of any additional income earned in the family until the family's income reached the nonpoverty level. As he explains it:

A family with no other income at all would receive a basic allowance scaled to the number of persons in the family. For a concrete example, take the basic allowance to be \$400 a year per person . . . a family's allowance would be reduced by a certain fraction of every dollar of other income it received . . . [Let us] take this fraction to be one-third. This means that the . . . total income including allowances will be increased by two-thirds of whatever it earns."

For a family of four the original allowance

would be \$1,600. Suppose there are actual earnings of \$900; the subsidy would then be cut by \$300, increasing the total income to \$2,200. This net would continue to increase with earnings until some previously established poverty line was reached. In both plans, the incentive to earn more is encouraged, for the family keeps the larger part of any actual earnings.

The proposals are flexible: the key is in the share of new earnings used to offset the subsidy. Such a share could be one-third as in the Tobin plan or a variable share as in Lampman's suggestion. It all depends on what policy-makers want to do.

In either case, the guaranteed income would be given as a matter of right. Individuals would receive their payments in periodic installments based on declarations of income, with final settlements made at the end of the tax year on April 15. Although the "negative tax" would be reduced by every dollar of earned income, there would be an incentive to earn, as total income under the scheme would increase faster than the reduction in the subsidy. Existing forms of income maintenance like old-age insurance would not be disturbed, but the benefits under the latter would have to be increased in order to establish a measure of equity.

It is indeed an interesting irony that the ad hoc committee's proposal for a guaranteed annual income, excoriated only a few years ago as an exercise in gloom and doom, should now be seriously considered as a way of meeting critical social problems. And why not? There are some 30 million Americans for whom the connection between income and work has been severed. The guaranteed annual income would offer them a measure of hope, much more promising than the degrading forms of categorical aid developed over the last half-century.

The more one reflects on the profound changes taking place in our society, the more one feels that guaranteed incomes and nega-

tive taxes represent a sensible approach to solving some of the problems generated by these changes. A society that has recreated Disraeli's Two Nations² can ill afford to reject measures that promise to correct the ensuing imbalances. Such imbalances in an affluent society are intolerable.

FOREIGN POLICY

(Continued from page 206)

different from Soviet intentions and are confined within similar parameters. The Chinese face internal problems far greater than those of the Soviet Union and need security to deal with their problems, which include closing the gap between food supply and population increase, the problems of increasing industrial production and additional non-agricultural jobs and, above all, the problems of political stability, political succession, and securing allegiance from a large and diverse population. Like the Soviet Union, China sees security in terms of being the center of a planetary system of satellite states; she sees prestige in terms of leadership of a world-wide Communist ideological bloc. Both of these ambitions bring the Soviet Union and China directly into collision with each other and only indirectly into collision with the United States, which has no frontier with either of them (as they have with each other). In fact, any concentration by the United States on its security will lead to a relaxation of United States pressures around the world on other issues and will simultaneously result in an increase in Sino-Soviet alienation.

The problem of stability in the Near East is now merging with the problems of security in all South Asia, as a consequence of the withdrawal of British influence east of Suez, the breakdown of the Dulles arrangements in South Asia, and the blockage of the Suez Canal.

In South Asia, the basic reality, not yet accepted or perhaps not even recognized in our State Department, is what I have referred to as the "cross alignment" of Pakis-

² The reference is to Benjamin Disraeli, British Prime Minister and author (1804-1881). The "two nations" were the rich and the poor of England. (*Sybil*, Book II, chapter 5.)

tan-China versus Indo-Soviet power in that area. This might be called "the Southern Cross" in international politics, although the survivors of the Dulles era might prefer to call it "the Southern Double-Cross."

To understand the reality, we must get away from the Oceanic view of Asia, which we inherited from Britain, and look at Asia from the Russian continental point of view, which was utilized by some British, such as Lord Curzon, in the nineteenth century. Curzon, whose point of view was either a generation too late or a generation too early, looked at Asia from the Pamirs. I would hardly advise this today, but just as the Far East must be regarded equally from the Pacific *and Mongolia*, so South Asia must be regarded from the Indian Ocean *and Kashmir*. Moreover, in both places, treaties on paper are much less significant than tacit understandings and half-hidden signals based on the realities of power balances on the spot.

The withdrawal of Britain from the Indian Ocean leaves a power vacuum all the way from Indonesia to the Red Sea, and most acutely in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. It occurred just as Soviet ships and submarines were beginning to come into the area and just as their access there was cut off from their Black Sea bases and made totally dependent on their Far East bases by the closing of the Suez Canal. This is advantageous to the United States; it blocks the Soviet western sea forces in the Mediterranean, whence they can emerge only via Gibraltar, an area much closer to our power than the Red Sea is ever likely to be.

Accordingly, we should make no real effort to open the Canal, since its closure makes any Soviet request for a base at a place like Aden or in the Persian Gulf very remote. The sheikdoms of these areas feel very naked in the wake of the British withdrawal, just as Malaysia does at the other end of Asia. Recently, there have been rumors of Soviet requests for bases in both areas. The United States should do what it can to oppose such bases, without committing itself to action on the Asia mainland. But an increased United

States presence in the Indian Ocean, with intermediate bases in Australia, New Zealand, possibly somewhere in South Africa, and perhaps elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, would reassure those who have been most disturbed by the British withdrawal.

In the Near East itself, the situation is so bad that stability seems almost unobtainable. But certain basic facts are clear. Arab culture is so disrupted and corrupt that no stability, progress or even agreement is possible, except unconstructive temporary alignments based on joint hatreds. On the other hand, the area also includes three of the world's greatest fighting peoples, the Ethiopians, the Turks and the Israelis. Some kind of an alignment of the United States with these three to work for the political, economic and social reconstruction of the whole Near East, with any Arab groups or states welcome to participate in the effort, might make life there sufficiently hopeful in a very uncertain future to keep the Soviet Union out.

Along these lines, some stability might be achieved without the exhaustion of United States wealth and energies in the chief parts of the Old World landmass. On that landmass, the chief structure would be a balance of China, Pakistan and a remote West Europe, balanced by Japan, India and the Soviet Union. The United States would have commitments to Australia, New Zealand, and probably Japan in the east, to Ethiopia, Israel, Turkey, and possibly Iran in the west. Indonesia, Southeast Asia, the Arab states, and Black Africa would be largely unaligned, with the Soviet Union and the United States following mutually self-denying policies of parallel aid, reducing the supply of weapons to them (if the weapons salesmen who are so influential in American foreign policy can be restrained), with a possible joint aid program under the administration of the United Nations or of some of the smaller nations.

What would that leave to occupy the resources and energies of Americans? A number of gigantic problems, beginning with our almost insoluble domestic problems. After these will come the equally huge problems of Latin America, to avoid, if possible, the out-

burst of guerrilla revolutionary activities in that area like the Vietcong in Southeast Asia. There will also remain another large puzzle: namely, how to control the Oceanic world as we have inherited it from the British but with all the new complexities of a thermo-nuclear, electronic, computerized age of psychological brainwashing and biological chemicals, which already seem beyond our powers to handle.

However securely Americans may sleep, following the Inaugural Balls of January 20, 1969, the problems of American foreign policy must be faced eventually by the new administration. They cannot be faced merely by tinkering with old policies, which must be replaced by a fundamental reappraisal of the United States basic needs and priorities in the foreign field. The basic American need is security, as it is in every country; this must be given priority. The chief obstacles to such a reassessment will be the inertia of the present erroneous policy in Vietnam, our almost equally mistaken foreign financial and economic policies, and the sudden upsurge of domestic problems. There is little doubt that the Vietnamese War will be de-escalated no matter who is inaugurated in January, simply because of the drift of American public opinion. How this can or should be done is too large an issue to be discussed here.

Our foreign financial policies and all our teeming domestic problems are even more complex. The administration in Washington in 1969-1973 must place these in the same framework of strategic priorities as our national security. Without national security they have little meaning, but their relations with this basic concern and with each other are interlocking. All these problems must be fitted together in the context of the power realities of the globe.*

* Note: More detailed information on the background of this discussion may be found in the following: Carroll Quigley, *The World Since 1939: A History* (New York: Collier Books, 1968); Alastair Lamb, *Asian Frontiers, Studies in a Continuing Problem* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968); Theodore Draper, *Abuse of Power* (New York: Viking, 1967); David Kraslow and Stuart Loory, *The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1968).

NEGROES AND POLITICS

(Continued from page 212)

seeable future. By "raceless individualism" is meant the view that racism will not truly be eliminated until whites view Negroes not as Negroes but as men, until, as Norman Podhoretz has stated, "... color [becomes] irrelevant by making it disappear as a fact of consciousness." The goal of a highly individualistic equality without group referents or distinctions is doubtless a glowing tribute to the mythology of America as a melting pot; if not millennial, however, it at least has not happened yet. In today's United States, very few people, white or black, can have original innocence: if by prejudice is meant seeing the other person's color or race, we are prejudiced, and can be expected to remain so. Negroes should not be led to believe in a concept of equality which requires that they lose or escape from their identity as Negroes.

Stated positively, the truth affirmed by Black Power is that the feasible goal is to work at changing the meaning of Negro identity, to seek individual freedom within, not outside, the group context of Negro American freedom. A redefinition of Negro identity, not its denial, is the essential prerequisite for any solutions of the Negro problem. In broad terms, this puts Negroes on the same track as earlier ethnic groups and commits them to seek a standing equivalent to what Italo-Americans and Polish-Americans have come to enjoy.

The implications for political rhetoric and for public policy are profound. Group equality becomes the highest-priority goal in the short run, and this emphatically is not the same thing as integration. Indeed, as Black Power advocates have perceptively insisted, without the prior condition of group equality, integration must be illusory for the mass of blacks and debasing for the few who are accepted. The goal of group equality presupposes, in turn, a lengthy stage of self-conscious Negro separatism in the attempt to develop and maintain collective pride, integrity and

a greater degree of self-sufficiency. And since color is a more visible badge of distinction than is nationality or religion, the stages characteristic of ethnic adjustment are likely to be more prolonged in the case of the Negro.

Attempts at political resolution of the Negro problem in 1968 and thereafter must recognize and act on this basic truth. The shift by Negroes toward separatism should not be viewed as aberrational, as signaling an angry and alienated black withdrawal from America or as repudiating integration as the ultimate goal. Rather, it signifies that Negroes have truly come of age, have correctly digested the American experience with regard to ethnic groups, and have now embarked on that short-run separatism which has proved in the past to be the necessary transition to integration and assimilation.

A NEW POLICY DIRECTION

The direction of public policy, though not its details, is readily inferable from acceptance of this basic truth. Black Power is as much mood as doctrine, and white America must have sufficient understanding and empathy to develop a complementary mood of its own. Black leadership must be self-selected and accepted on those terms by whites, and whites must forego seizing upon every black expression of hostility or conflict as detrimental to the progress of race relations.

The initiation and administration of public policy on the Negro must heavily involve black leaders. Innovations and departures from established values must be welcomed, and traditional concepts of efficiency and accountability may well have to be relaxed. An appreciation of the Negro pursuit of a new and positive group identity requires careful attention to satisfying symbolic and psychological needs as well as material benefits. The overblown rhetoric suggesting the immediacy of the achievement of race equality must be toned down on both sides, but this can be done only in the context of an assured, persistent and sympathetic commitment of government assistance for Negro advance.

Adherence to these admonitions provides,

of course, no guarantees of success, but a disregard of them is surely a recipe for failure. Much turns on the receptivity of white America to the aspirations of its fellow blacks. The record of the 1960's thus far is mixed, at best. The stakes are high; Black Power can lead to alienation, hatred and violence as well as to positive outcomes. And, for all of its aggressive assertions of independence and separatism, the Negro mood—like that of earlier ethnic groups—is basically a function of the attitudes and actions of the larger society. It will be white America's decision whether Negro separatism becomes a permanent fact or only a lengthy interim stage on the way to full integration.

THE CHALLENGE OF INFLATION

(Continued from page 217)

Then, again, the attempt to curb our excessive demand pressures may prove all too successful. The aim is to cut back just enough to prevent excesses. Failure to do so can lead to undue speculation which can lead to recession. There is also a danger that the cutback may be so successful that widespread unemployment may ensue. In a sense, this is what happened when an attempt was made to curb spending in 1966 by relying solely on raising interest rates. In the process, the construction industry was hurt badly. As it became hard to obtain mortgage money to buy a new house, many contractors and their suppliers went bankrupt. Another such overreaction will have political consequences.

There is little doubt that the economic situation in 1968 presents a considerably greater problem than it did in 1964. The main economic difficulty today is inflation and inflation, in turn, is both a cause and an effect of many other difficulties. The big challenge for a new administration will be to find the funds to finance domestic and foreign programs without further overheating the economy and thereby jeopardizing long-run economic growth. This may necessitate some careful pruning of government expenditures or another tax increase.

SELECTIVE SERVICE

(Continued from page 223)

possible use of volunteers; (2) to reduce the period of uncertainty during which men are subject to call; and (3) to assure greater fairness and uniformity in the administration of deferment policies. Most of the reforms could be obtained by executive action alone, though certain changes in the law were requested.

FAIR

Accepting the conclusion of all three of the studies referred to above that in determining the order of call of those available the "oldest man first" procedure was not desirable, the Defense Department proposed what it called a Fair and Impartial Random (FAIR) selection system, in other words, a lottery. Student deferments would be limited to four years of undergraduate education. Young men found qualified and available for service by their local draft boards would be classified I-A in the year when they reached 19 or in the year when their student deferment expired. The random selection, or lottery, would be conducted annually or semi-annually to determine the sequence of induction of these men, and local boards would go as far down the list as needed to fill their quotas. After this year of maximum exposure, those not selected would be placed at the bottom of the next year's list, and then would be placed progressively lower each year until they reached age 26 (or age 35, if previously deferred). Technically, they would remain liable to call, but it would be unlikely for them to be called except in case of a major emergency.

Curiously, the Defense Department plan was announced as having the approval of the President, but then he backed away from it. The new draft law enacted in June, 1967, contained the recommended provision on reducing student deferments, but the President did not move to put into effect the random selection system even though he could have done so on his authority.

Interest in the draft was so strong that all

the major candidates for the presidential nominations felt it necessary to take a position well before the nominating conventions.

Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts had become a leading advocate of selective service reform in the Senate, and his proposals presumably reflected the views of the late Senator Robert Kennedy, a contender for the Democratic nomination before his assassination. In February, 1968, the younger Kennedy introduced a bill which would (1) authorize the President to set up a lottery system (which he already could do if he chose); (2) require the drafting of 19-year-olds first; (3) set up national, uniform classifications; (4) establish national, uniform deferments; (5) reorganize the Selective Service System on a regional and city basis; and (6) grant college deferments for a period of four years, but with a proviso that if casualties among men drafted in any three-month period were as high as 10 per cent, all college deferments would be cancelled for 12 months.

A little later Senator Edward Kennedy suggested a one-year study of the possibility of an all-volunteer Army and a National Service Corps.

Former Vice President Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate, maintained that the nation should have a volunteer army, but that no major changes should be made so long as the conflict in Vietnam continued.

Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, a contender for the Democratic nomination, on several occasions called simply for "curbing the powers" of the Selective Service System, and for the retirement of General Lewis B. Hershey as director. He indicated a willingness to grant amnesty to men who had gone to Canada to avoid the draft, and to other objectors who had remained in the United States, provided they would accept some civilian service as an alternative.

New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, seeking the Republican nomination, espoused a system remarkably close to that proposed by the Defense Department—registration at age 18; at age 19 or after four years of college, the young men would enter a zone of selection for one year from which they would be called

according to a lottery. Once that year had passed, those men would no longer be subject to call except in a major emergency.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, called for a new system of national service which would be based upon a program of domestic service and revised draft laws.

How important an issue selective service will be, or what impact it may have on the outcome of the election, remains to be seen. In any event, the campaign and election will probably bring further changes to the selective service system.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

(Continued from page 229)

man and his total environment, including the health, economic, social, political and technical factors.

Standards of environmental quality must remain flexible so that they can be adjusted as new knowledge is acquired, as financial situations improve, and as the public better understands the problems and issues. An informed public will participate more actively in assessing goals and determining the uses to which the environment is to be put, and the amount it is willing to pay.

All segments of society must share in the cost for pollution abatement. Our land, water and air are a heritage of the whole nation and must be protected for the benefit of future generations.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 234)

litical opinion polling and the use of television, public relations firms and advertising agencies in the direction of modern campaigns. He recounts amusing and horrifying examples of campaign vituperation from American political history. While he finds much to deplore, and advances several suggestions for improvement, Abels' conclusion is that change for the

better is unlikely to take place in the near future. O.E.S.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON RURAL POVERTY

(Continued from page 238)

The Commission further recommends that a single unified housing agency be made responsible for housing programs in rural areas and that credit terms be made more responsive to need. The Commission also urges a substantial increase in appropriations for Indian housing.

(9) The Commission believes that the overlapping patchwork of districts, organizations, plans, and programs for development impedes the economic development of lagging and poverty-stricken areas and regions. It, therefore, recommends the creation of multicounty districts, cutting across urban-rural boundaries, to cooperatively plan and coordinate programs for economic development. To finance development, the Commission recommends Federal grants, loans, and industrial development subsidies, as well as State and local tax reform.

(10) The Commission believes that without citizen responsibility, which includes the active involvement and participation of all, antipoverty and economic development programs will flounder. Therefore, the Commission recommends that increased attention be given to involving the poor in the affairs of the community, on both local and areawide levels. Specific suggestions are made for improving the effectiveness of the antipoverty programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Department of Agriculture.

(11) The Commission recommends that the Federal Government re-examine its commercial farm programs in order to make sure that adjustments in the supply of farm products are not made at the expense of the rural poor. Public programs are recommended to enlarge small farm operations and to retire submarginal land from commercial production, but with safeguards protecting the interest of low income families living on submarginal land. The Commission also recommends that the development of additional farmland with public funds cease until the nation's food and fiber needs require this development.

(12) Without effective government at all levels, the recommendations in this report will not result in the eradication of rural poverty. The Commission recommends changes in program development and administration to facilitate and encourage the effective involvement of local, State, and Federal governments.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

(Continued from page 235)

FOREIGN POLICY

An honorable ending to the war in Vietnam; no unilateral withdrawal of forces; support of Paris peace talks; no demand for unconditional surrender. The encouragement of fair and safeguarded elections open to all parties after hostilities cease. Economic aid to the entire region for further economic, social and political development. Selective economic and military aid based on the willingness of other nations to cooperate in regional development plans.

CIVIL RIGHTS

Continuance of the march toward full equality under the law; strengthening of legislation against discrimination in employment; assistance to victims of past oppression to take full advantage of opportunities; funding of the Bilingual Education Act to assist Spanish-speaking citizens; increased help to the American Indians; increased home rule for the District of Columbia; and until that legislation is passed, the provision of a non-voting delegate in Congress.

WELFARE AND HEALTH

A partnership of government and private enterprise to stem rises in costs of medical care; increased health research; construction of new medical facilities and training schools; improved maternal and child health facilities. Thorough evaluation of family income plans; expansion of school lunch programs; revision of inequitable state welfare standards. Increases in benefits under the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance; inclusion of prescription drugs in Medicare.

EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS

Increased minimum wage standards; extension of the minimum wage to all workers; additional safety legislation to reduce the 2 million disabling accidents each year; modernization of unemployment compensation.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

(Continued from page 235)

FOREIGN POLICY

Offers of foreign aid to the neediest nations only, and that only when domestic needs permit; East-West trade only with Communist nations that prove by their deeds that they seek peace; a fair hearing to those businesses threatened by foreign competition; an end to the Middle East arms race (but a promise of continued support for Israel); opposition to the recognition of Communist China "at present."

NATIONAL DEFENSE

Restoration of United States pre-eminence in military strength by an increase in the construction of submarines; greatly increased support of a ship-building program for the merchant fleet; a simplification of the Department of Defense; reinvigorating the National Security Council; strengthening the gathering and evaluation of intelligence in the military services.

VIETNAM

New leadership capable of thinking and acting anew, to overcome past failures; adoption of strategy to strengthen local forces and sense of nationhood; progressive de-Americanization of the fighting; pursuance of a peace based on self-determination and a fair and equitable settlement for all.

WELFARE AND HEALTH

Drastic revision of welfare and poverty programs to encourage self-reliance and work motivation; encouragement of state and local corporations to help the poor establish their own businesses; insurance coverage for homes damaged by riots; maximum reliance on community leadership and cooperation between police and slum residents; a unified federal food distribution program; encouragement of private enterprise in the work of consumer education and protection. The encouragement of private health insurance plans; expansion of hospital construction.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of August, 1968, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Asian and Pacific Council

Aug. 1—The 9-member Asian and Pacific Council ends a 3-day meeting in Canberra, Australia. A communiqué is issued, in which South Vietnam's and South Korea's efforts at development are applauded.

Czech Crisis

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Aug. 1—The 4-day conference of Czech and Soviet Communist party leaders at Cierna, a border town in Czechoslovakia, ends. It is announced that Czech leaders will meet with delegations from the Soviet Union and the 4 other Communist bloc nations opposing Czech democratization at the Slovak capital of Bratislava on August 3. It is reported that Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce the bitter press denunciations against each other.

Aug. 2—Czech Communist party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek addresses the nation by radio on the results of the Cierna meeting. He promises that Czechoslovakia will "continue resolutely along the road taken by the Czechoslovak Communist party and all our people in January of this year."

Aug. 3—At Bratislava, leaders from the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria meet with Czechoslovak officials. At the end of this one-day summit conference, a 10-page document is released in which national sovereignty is supported. In Prague the Defense Ministry announces the removal of the last Soviet troops from Czech territory.

Aug. 9—Yugoslav President Tito arrives in Prague for a 2-day visit.

Aug. 13—East German President and Communist party chief Walter Ulbricht leaves Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia where he

met with Alexander Dubcek yesterday.

Aug. 15—A warm welcome is given President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania as he arrives in Prague to renew a friendship treaty.

Aug. 17—Czech Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek says he will not exclude the possibility of discussions with West Germany, but that establishment of diplomatic relations is still in the future.

Aug. 19—*Pravda* (Soviet Communist party newspaper) publishes an attack on Czechoslovakia, charging that her government is unwilling to put down a campaign against pro-Soviet factory workers in Prague, who had sent a letter to Moscow last month to urge stationing Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

Aug. 21—Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian and East German troops cross into Czechoslovakia. Soviet planes land at the Prague airport. The Prague radio urges Czechs not to resist the invasion.

Aug. 22—It is reported that some 23 persons have been killed in clashes with occupying forces. It is also reported that Soviet troops have taken into custody Alexander Dubcek and 5 other liberal Czechoslovak Communist leaders.

Conservative pro-Soviet Communists elect 3 conservative Czech Communists to run the party under the occupying forces.

The Czechoslovak Communist party holds a secret meeting where some 1,200 delegates elect a new 160-man Central Committee. The Central Committee in turn elects a new 24-member Presidium. Five new Presidium members are elected to replace breakaway conservatives. The secret congress of supporters of liberal leader Alexander Dubcek issues an ultimatum that occupying forces withdraw within 24 hours and release all detained Czechoslovak leaders, or a general strike will be

held tomorrow. At the moment Czechoslovakia is being ruled by the military command of the Warsaw Pact occupying forces because a pro-Soviet government cannot be formed.

Aug. 23—Czech President Ludvik Svoboda arrives in the Soviet Union, where he is received with full honors.

In Czechoslovakia, a one-hour general strike is held to demonstrate resistance to the occupation.

Aug. 24—It is disclosed that Dubcek, Premier Oldrich Cernik and Josef Smrkovsky, President of the National Assembly, have joined Svoboda in the Moscow talks.

Aug. 26—It is reported by the Czechoslovak Embassy spokesman in Moscow that officials from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany arrived yesterday to join the Czech-Soviet negotiations.

Aug. 27—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) publishes a Czech-Soviet communiqué on the outcome of talks in Moscow between Soviet and Czech leaders, including members of the Czech Presidium. The communiqué declares that "Agreement was reached on measures aimed at the speediest normalization of the situation in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." In the communiqué, the removal of the Czech question from U.N. consideration is demanded.

In a speech to the Czech people on his arrival home, Dubcek tries to allay indignation over the Moscow agreement, which is considered by many to be a capitulation to Soviet demands.

President Svoboda, in his address to the nation, urges Czechs "to continue to manifest wisdom and prudence."

Aug. 28—In Prague authoritative sources report that at a cabinet meeting, Svoboda disclosed that Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia will take place over "several months" and that at least 2 Soviet divisions will be permanently stationed near the West German frontier. The National Assembly adopts an 8-point resolution declaring that the Czechoslovakian army can defend its own borders and urging a firm date be scheduled for the removal of foreign troops.

Aug. 29—The President of the National Assembly, Josef Smrkovsky, in a broadcast to the nation, appeals for "calm and coolness." He announces that "special measures in the field of radio, television and the press" will be taken "to prevent writings against the . . . interests of the republic." Non-Communist "political clubs" will be dissolved.

Aug. 30—Reports from Czechoslovakia say that Czech leaders will meet with other Warsaw Pact leaders in Dresden, East Germany, about Sept. 10 to discuss a gradual withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia.

Czech writers are reported to be under arrest following a "roundup" by Soviet intelligence agents.

Aug. 31—Acceding to Soviet demands, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist party opens a 2-day session to reorganize its leadership.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

Aug. 6—World Bank President Robert S. McNamara announces that World Bank lending to underdeveloped countries will be expanded.

International Monetary Crisis

Aug. 8—*The New York Times* reports that last month a meeting of central bankers in Basel, Switzerland, decided to buy gold in the free market at \$35 an ounce if necessary.

Latin America

Aug. 11—A 10-day meeting of representatives of Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador to work out a plan for a common market is suspended. The representatives of Bolivia, Chile and Colombia announce agreement on a text of a common market treaty. The representatives of Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador declare that they find the text objectionable and cannot sign it.

Middle East

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Aug. 4—Israeli Air Force jet planes strike against a reported Arab guerrilla stronghold northwest of Amman.

Aug. 6—Israeli forces cross the ceasefire line into Jordan in pursuit of Arab commandos, who had shot bazooka shells into an infirmary.

Aug. 11—*The New York Times* reports that Arab diplomats in Cairo have disclosed easier Arab terms for a Middle East solution: the U.A.R. will accept the internationalization of the Gaza Strip, will withdraw demands that Arab refugees be allowed to return to their homeland; will consent to demilitarizing the Sinai Peninsula; will permit Israeli cargoes to pass through the Suez Canal and Israeli vessels to continue to use the Strait of Tiran.

Aug. 13—It is announced that the 2 Syrian Air Force pilots, who landed their MIG-17 jet fighter planes at an Israeli airstrip yesterday, had lost their way and believed themselves to be in Lebanon.

The International Federation of Airline Pilots announces that it has asked pilots on commercial flights between Western Europe and Algeria to terminate such flights to force Algeria to release the Israeli airliner hijacked last month.

Aug. 18—In Jerusalem, 5 heavy explosions, apparently the work of Arab terrorists, cause injury to 14 Israelis.

Hundreds of Israeli youths riot for 2 hours in the former Jordanian sector of Jerusalem.

The New York Times reports that yesterday Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, U.N. Secretary General U Thant's special representative in the Middle East, informed the U.A.R. that the Israeli government insists on directly negotiating a Middle East settlement with the Arab countries involved.

United Nations

Aug. 5—At Jordan's request, the Security Council meets to hear Jordan's complaint that Israeli jet planes yesterday attacked a supposed Arab guerrilla camp 13 miles

northwest of Amman, Jordan's capital. (See also *Intl, Middle East.*)

Aug. 16—The Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution charging Israel with "flagrant violation" of the U.N. Charter and Security Council resolutions on the Middle East because of her reprisal raids against Jordan.

Aug. 21—The Security Council, voting 13-2, places the Czech crisis on its agenda despite a Soviet protest that it was no concern of the Council. (See also *Intl, Czech Crisis.*)

Aug. 22—During debate on the Czech crisis, Jan Muzik, Czechoslovak acting chief representative, demands that Communist Bloc troops withdraw immediately from Czechoslovakia and defends the legality of Alexander Dubcek's regime.

Aug. 24—Czech Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek, addressing the Security Council, asserts that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was an act "which cannot be justified for any reason."

War in Vietnam

Aug. 3—In Paris, members of the U.S. delegation to the peace talks reveal that they have unsuccessfully attempted to discover whether the lull in the fighting in Vietnam is politically meaningful.

Aug. 4—The 3 U.S. Air Force pilots recently released by North Vietnam arrive in the U.S.

Aug. 7—In Paris, the chief U.S. delegate to the peace talks, W. Averell Harriman, tells North Vietnamese negotiators that 14 North Vietnamese sailors held by the U.S. will be released soon.

Aug. 9—From Paris, *The New York Times* reports that "authoritative North Vietnamese sources" are playing down rumors that the 8-week-old fighting lull in South Vietnam has political significance.

Aug. 12—In a news conference, Nguyen Thanh Le, North Vietnamese spokesman in Paris, criticizes the Republican party and its presidential candidate Richard Nixon for their attitude toward North Vietnam.

Aug. 15—It is reported that 72 civilians were killed last week when U.S. soldiers with

flamethrowers fought Vietcong ambushers.
 Aug. 19—The allied command reports that yesterday North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces staged 19 separate attacks throughout South Vietnam.

Aug. 22—Vietcong forces shell central Saigon with rockets, for the first time in 2 months.

Aug. 23—Enemy troops stage heavy mortar and rocket attacks against cities and military bases in the northeast provinces of South Vietnam.

Aug. 27—The U.S. government, in a statement disclosed by U.S. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey, tells the Hanoi delegation at the Paris peace talks to stop interfering "in internal American affairs."

Aug. 30—A South Vietnamese Special Forces camp is overrun by enemy troops in the Central Lowlands.

Warsaw Pact

Aug. 4—A.D.N., East German press agency, reports that a new chief of staff for Warsaw Pact forces has been named; he is Soviet General Sergei M. Shtemenko, who succeeds retiring Soviet General Mikhail I. Kazakov.

ARGENTINA

Aug. 4—It is reported that impoverished Tucumán Province in northern Argentina is in a state of near rebellion.

BOLIVIA

Aug. 3—In Cochabamba, 2 persons are killed and 10 injured as police and militia clash with anti-Government student demonstrators.

Aug. 4—President René Barrientos Ortuño summons Congress to reopen its 1968 session, signaling the end to the political crisis which followed the flight of former Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas to Chile.

Aug. 17—Antonio Arguedas returns after fleeing to Chile, London, New York and Lima, and says that for 3 years he had been forced to act as an agent for the C.I.A. He describes his relations with the C.I.A. for the press, and says his motives in turning over

the Ernesto "Che" Guevara diaries to the Cubans was less an act of revenge than a desire to destroy the "imperialist entanglement into which Bolivia has fallen."

BRAZIL

Aug. 21—Brazil devalues the cruzeiro by 13 per cent and suspends all foreign exchange operations until August 27. The value of the new cruzeiro is fixed at 3.65 to the dollar.

BRUNEI

Aug. 1—Hassanel Bolkiah is crowned Sultan; he replaces his father, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, who abdicated last October.

CAMBODIA

Aug. 8—Prince Norodom Sihanouk says U.S. troops threaten Cambodian border provinces and warns he will call on Chinese and Vietnamese Communists for help if the pressure increases.

Aug. 15—The Cambodian government demands 14 bulldozers as the price for releasing the 11 U.S. soldiers and one South Vietnamese seized when they strayed into Cambodian territory.

CANADA

Aug. 6—An end to the 20-day postal strike is negotiated, subject to ratification of the agreement by 24,000 workers.

CHILE

Aug. 9—It is reported that the U.S. is studying a massive aid program to help Chile overcome the effects of the worst drought in her history, which has caused severe hardship in rural areas and the curtailment of production due to lack of hydroelectric power.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Aug. 1—An editorial, printed jointly in three publications, *Jenmin Jih Pao*, *Hung Chi* and *Chieh Fang Chun Pao*, states a new policy declaration giving the army a stronger role in political matters.

Aug. 4—An editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao*, official government newspaper, calls for national unity behind Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Defense Minister Lin Piao and condemns the development of "many centers of power."

Aug. 15—A radio broadcast from Canton reports that several student and worker organizations have been condemned as "class enemies" for their extreme leftist militarism.

Aug. 17—Editorials in the Shanghai newspaper *Wen Hui Pao* report Chinese government authorities are trying to push the economy ahead in production.

COLOMBIA

Aug. 23—Pope Paul VI, in Bogota to attend the 39th International Eucharistic Congress, calls on the government and the wealthy to accept agrarian reform and more equitable taxes to aid the poor.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Aug. 2—An appeal for national unity is broadcast by President Alphonse Massamba-Debat. He pardons all political prisoners in an apparent effort to prevent a left-wing attack against the government.

Aug. 3—Secretary of Defense Augustin Poignet is declared President of the Republic "in the absence of Mr. Massamba-Debat," who is reported to have left the capital.

Aug. 4—Coup leaders announce that Mr. Massamba-Debat will continue as President and will form a new government in consultation with the army.

Aug. 30—A military camp said to be occupied by leftist groups of the militia and police is besieged by the army of the Congo Republic.

CUBA

Aug. 13—Premier Fidel Castro dismisses Lieutenant Orlando Borrego Diaz as minister of the sugar industry. The Havana radio says he has been replaced by an engineer, Francisco Padrón, to "insure more efficient coordination in the execution of the sugar plan."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

Aug. 13—The government thanks citizens who have donated 40 pounds of gold and \$20 million to strengthen the country's drive toward liberalization.

The New York Times reports that Czech and Yugoslav officials are discussing the merger of several enterprises and are planning closer cooperation in banking activities.

ECUADOR

Aug. 14—The Foreign Ministry denounces as "an instrument of pressure" a law signed by President Lyndon Johnson that suspends economic aid to Latin American countries that seize U.S. fishing boats in waters outside the 12-mile territorial limit. The Chamber of Deputies reaffirms Ecuador's 200-mile territorial limit imposed last year.

FRANCE

(See *U.S. Foreign Policy*)

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Aug. 9—Communist Party leader Walter Ulbricht declares the German Democratic Republic is prepared to negotiate with the Federal Republic (West Germany) on a pact renouncing the use of force between them.

Aug. 12—Ulbricht meets with Czech Communist party leader Alexander Dubcek. An atmosphere of coolness is apparent to observers. Talks focus on relations between the two countries who are involved in a dispute over Czechoslovakia's liberalization. (See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*.)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Aug. 16—A West German senior government official is quoted as saying that his country is willing to declare the 1938 Munich Pact as "null from the outset." This treaty made possible Hitler's occupation of Czech border regions before World War II. Its rejection by West Germany would pave the way for

improved relations with Czechoslovakia.

Aug. 17—Karl Schiller, Economics Minister, says he will meet with his East German counterpart, Horst Solle, to discuss possible improvements in trade.

GREECE

Aug. 5—Captain Ioannis Zervopoulos and Lieutenant Christos Haralambopoulos are sentenced to long prison terms for attempting to overthrow the regime.

Aug. 6—The military government announces that voting on the new constitution September 29 will be compulsory.

GUATEMALA

Aug. 28—John Gordon Mein, the United States Ambassador to Guatemala, is slain by machine-gun fire as he is riding to his embassy. The assassins are believed to be left-wing terrorists.

Aug. 29—A statement by the Rebel Armed Forces, a Communist guerrilla organization, claims responsibility for killing Ambassador Mein.

HAITI

Aug. 14—President François Duvalier changes death sentences to indeterminate prison terms for 10 men convicted by a military tribunal of an attempted invasion of Haiti on May 20.

Aug. 19—The U.S. State Department confirms that Thomas H. Carter, a 23-year-old Foreign Service officer, was beaten unconscious on July 8, 1968, in a Port-au-Prince cafe by a Haitian.

Aug. 20—It is reported that President Duvalier in an interview with the press says he will wait until after the U.S. election to consider possible steps to improve relations with the U.S.

INDIA

Aug. 2—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announces that India has sealed off the borders with Burma to prevent underground Naga forces from returning from Communist China.

INDONESIA

Aug. 11—Regional army commanders are summoned to Jakarta by the Government to discuss security problems in eastern Java caused by insurgent Communist forces.

JAPAN

Aug. 22—The student strike against the University of Tokyo enters its third month. The strike began when medical students demanded reform of their faculty.

LEBANON

Aug. 4—Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros issues a formal protest to the Syrian government over high taxes levied against Lebanese goods. The tariffs are in retaliation for Lebanese moves in harboring Syrians charged with plotting against the Baathist regime in Syria.

MALAYSIA

Aug. 7—An agreement with the Philippines to have a cooling-off period over Sabah is greeted with pleasure by Prime Minister Prince Abdul Rahman.

MEXICO

Aug. 1—In a peaceful march, 50,000 students protest violation of university autonomy by the police and army.

Aug. 27—Nearly 200,000 students in Mexico City stage a demonstration against the regime of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.

NIGERIA

Aug. 3—Negotiators for the Nigerian government leave for Addis Ababa to start the third round of peace talks with Biafran delegates.

Aug. 5—Biafran leader Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu says that only the sovereignty of Biafra will insure the survival of his people.

Aug. 6—Ojukwu leaves Addis Ababa after a dispute over the presence of Gabonese officials brought by the Biafran delegation.

Aug. 7—Nigerian government negotiators offer a milder peace plan to Biafra.

Aug. 8—Biafran guerrilla forces ambush Nigerian troops in a hit-and-run raid.

Aug. 9—Biafran negotiators insist on sovereignty and turn down the latest plan offered by the Nigerian government.

Aug. 10—Anti-aircraft fire from Nigerian forces causes the suspension of flights bringing food and medicine to Biafrans by the International Red Cross.

Aug. 13—Truce talks in Addis Ababa remain stalemated.

Aug. 15—The federal government of Nigeria rejects an International Red Cross plan to fly food supplies to starving Biafrans.

Aug. 16—A ceasefire is rejected by Nigerian chief of state Major General Yakubu Gowon.

Aug. 19—Civilians evacuate the city of Aba, one of the 3 remaining in Biafran control.

Aug. 25—The Nigerian government announces the capture of the Biafran city of Aba.

PAKISTAN

Aug. 11—Communist China has offered to help Pakistan with a major flood control project in East Pakistan where recent floods killed some 200 people, according to Pakistani Foreign Minister Arshad Husain.

RHODESIA

Aug. 1—Security forces of Rhodesian army troops and South African police smash a new attempt by black African guerrillas to infiltrate Rhodesia from Zambia.

Aug. 9—High Court Judge Harold E. Davies rules in Salisbury that the regime of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith has achieved legal status.

RUMANIA

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

Aug. 21—President Nicolae Ceausescu tells a cheering crowd that Rumania condemns the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He warns of armed resistance if the U.S.S.R. tries to invade Rumania.

Aug. 23—A huge 4-hour parade in Bucharest demonstrates Rumania's determination to maintain freedom from Soviet control.

SOUTHERN YEMEN

Aug. 4—It is reported that Southern Yemeni Foreign Minister Saif Dhali has returned from a week's visit to Yemen where he sought Yemen's help in putting down dissident tribes in the north who have taken up arms against the Government.

Aug. 9—South Yemeni Information Minister Abdullah Ali Akba declares that government troops have crushed the rebel uprising in the north.

SPAIN

Aug. 5—A state of emergency is declared in the Basque province of Guipuzcazo following terrorist slaying of a policeman.

Aug. 6—Spanish police round up suspects and arrest some 50 Basques, among them lawyers, doctors and priests.

Aug. 10—The Spanish government asks the U.S. to give \$1 billion in military aid over the next 5 years in return for renewal of leases on military bases in Spain.

Aug. 15—Partial military law has been imposed by the government in an attempt to suppress Basque nationalist activities.

Aug. 16—Voters in Spanish Guinea (Africa) approve a constitution which will grant them independence from Spain on October 12, 1968. 114,853 voters go to the polls, with 63 per cent approving the constitution.

THAILAND

Aug. 24—According to reports from Thai officials, Thailand is disturbed by the cutbacks in United States personnel in the aid missions. The staff reductions are part of the round of cuts caused by the \$6 billion budget cut demanded by the U.S. Congress. Thai officials are worried by increasing unemployment as construction projects are dropped.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

Aug. 9—*Pravda*, official newspaper of the Communist party, warns against any move toward liberalization by Soviet citizens.

Aug. 16—The Communist party newspaper, *Pravda*, and the government newspaper,

Izvestia, condemn Czechoslovak publications for attacks on their Communist neighbors.

Aug. 17—The governments of Japan and the U.S.S.R. agree to the joint development of virgin timberland in eastern Siberia.

Aug. 18—*Pravda* says that the Czechoslovak government is losing control of the country to "enemies of socialism."

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Aug. 6—Unofficial reports state that a number of arrests are taking place in the absence of President Gamal Abdel Nasser who is receiving medical treatment in the U.S.S.R. A number of Army officers are reported to be among those arrested.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Aug. 7—In a night of intermittent racial rioting in Miami, 52 people are arrested; at least 7 persons, including 3 news reporters, are injured.

Aug. 16—Federal District Judge Talbot Smith bans a referendum aimed at overthrowing Detroit's open housing law. Judge Smith rules that state and federal laws ban housing discrimination and that a local referendum would be without force and effect.

Aug. 17—At a rally held in Memphis, the leaders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference pledge to continue seeking an end to racial segregation through non-violent means.

Police in St. Petersburg, Florida, use tear gas to disperse about 100 young Negroes in the aftermath of a street brawl.

Aug. 22—Phil Hutchings, program director of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (S.N.C.C.), announces the organization is breaking its ties with Stokely Carmichael, its former chairman.

Economy

Aug. 7—When the U.S. Steel Corporation announces price increases on many products averaging some 2.5 per cent, other steel producers roll back their price increase to comparable proportions, compromising

with Government demands that steel price rises be kept to a minimum. ((See also *U.S. Government and Military*.)

Aug. 8—Arthur M. Okum, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, reports that for the first time in U.S. history, half of all American families had incomes of more than \$8,000 in 1967. Some 5.3 million American families out of a total of 49.8 million are still in the poverty category.

Aug. 14—Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Wilbur D. Mills says that the surtax on federal income taxes will have to be continued by the next President.

Aug. 15—The Federal Reserve System cuts the basic lending rate from 5½ per cent to 5¼ per cent.

Aug. 16—Treasury Secretary Henry H. Fowler reports an improvement in the balance of payments. Deficits in the April-June quarter dropped to \$150 million, the lowest in 2 years.

Foreign Policy

((See also *Intl, Czech Crisis and War in Vietnam*)

Aug. 13—The Treasury announces that the U.S. plans to impose "countervailing duties" of 2.5 per cent on most French imports until France abolishes her subsidies.

Aug. 19—President Lyndon B. Johnson rules out any change in Vietnamese war policy. No further de-escalation will be ordered until Hanoi de-escalates.

Aug. 20—President Johnson summons the National Security Council to discuss the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Aug. 21—Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts assails the Administration's Vietnam policy. He calls for an unconditional end to bombings and the mutual withdrawal of troops by Hanoi and the U.S.

White House Press Secretary George Christian says the Administration will pursue talks on arms limitations with the U.S.S.R. despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

President Johnson denounces the invasion of Czechoslovakia but says there is no safe way for the U.S. to resist the move.

Government

(See also *Economy*)

Aug. 1—The most comprehensive housing bill in the nation's history is signed by the President, providing \$5.3 billion for rehabilitation or new construction of more than 1.7 million housing units during the next 3 years. Nearly 500,000 low-income families will be helped to purchase homes, and some 700,000 units will be built for low and moderate income tenants.

Aug. 3—Protesting the rises in the price of most steel products, the President orders all federal agencies to limit steel purchases to companies that have not announced across-the-board-price increases.

Aug. 13—The Department of Justice offers \$4.35 million in federal money to states to help prepare for and avoid rioting in urban centers.

Aug. 16—The Civil Service Commission inaugurates uniform pay scales for blue collar workers in the federal government.

Aug. 17—The Farmers Home Administration announces that about 15,000 new homes will be built in rural areas under new legislation expanding home loan programs.

Legislation increasing federal support of construction of medical, dental and nursing schools is signed by the President.

Aug. 23—President Johnson signs a bill giving increased self-government to the Virgin Islands. Starting in 1970, the Islanders will elect their own governor.

Labor

Aug. 15—The American Telephone and Telegraph Company and its long lines department employees sign a 3-year contract.

Aug. 17—The Western Electric Company and its warehouse and distribution workers sign a 3-year contract.

Aug. 28—A 3-year contract is signed by the United Farmworkers Organizing Committee, headed by Cesar Chavez and the Paul Masson Wine Company. Wages are increased from the present \$1.80 per hour to \$2.75 per hour. Fringe benefits include health insurance payments and paid holidays.

Military

Aug. 1—Procurement of steel is limited by the Department of Defense to companies that have not raised steel prices. (See also *Government*.)

Aug. 16—A military spokesman for the Department of Defense announces the closing of 23 missile bases in 12 states to save money.

Two new multiple missiles, the *Poseidon* and the *Minuteman Space 3*, are successfully tested.

Aug. 17—Cause of the 4 crashes of the F-111 fighter-bombers is attributed to broken welds in a small valve rod assembly. Assemblies are now being made in a single piece to eliminate the hazard.

Aug. 20—Army Secretary Stanley Resor authorizes payment to Utah sheep raisers following the death of 6,000 sheep by poison gas released accidentally in a military test.

Aug. 21—The Army is moving lethal nerve gas from its arsenal northeast of heavily populated Denver.

Aug. 27—Production of 2 new bomber planes will be slowed to save \$201 million as part of the budget cut ordered by Congress.

Politics

Aug. 1—Former Vice President Richard Nixon tells the Republican Platform Committee that "the war must be ended," calling for a "phasing out" of American troops and a negotiated settlement of the war.

Aug. 8—Richard Nixon is nominated as the Republican candidate for the Presidency on the first ballot by the 29th Republican National Convention.

Governor Spiro T. Agnew of Maryland is nominated as the vice-presidential Republican candidate in accord with Nixon's wishes.

Aug. 10—South Dakota Senator George S. McGovern announces his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Nixon and Agnew confer with President Lyndon Johnson on the progress being made in the Paris talks on Vietnam.

Aug. 17—Georgia's Governor Lester Maddox

says he will seek the Democratic presidential nomination as a representative of American conservatives.

Aug. 25—Some 5,000 National Guardsmen and many thousands of federal troops are flown to Chicago to avert possible rioting as the Democratic National Convention opens.

Aug. 26—The Democratic National Convention opens in Chicago. A floor fight over rules and delegate credentials delays the program.

Aug. 27—A protest over the Administration-approved plank on the Vietnam War delays adoption of the platform. The "peace plank" is defeated by 1,567 to 1,041 votes.

Governor Lester Maddox withdraws from the campaign for nomination before balloting begins.

Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy reasserts that he will refuse a draft.

Peace demonstrators in the streets of Chicago are attacked by thousands of Chicago police using tear gas and swinging clubs.

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey is nominated as the Democratic candidate for the presidency on the first ballot, defeating Senator George McGovern of South Dakota and Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota.

For the first time in American political history a Negro, the Reverend Channing Phillips of Washington, D.C., is nominated as a favorite son candidate.

Aug. 29—The Democratic National Convention nominates Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine as the vice-presidential candidate. In his acceptance speech, Humphrey bars rigidity in Vietnam and calls for unity in achieving a new standard of life for every American.

URUGUAY

Aug. 2—A reliable banking source says that at least 44 state bank officials were dismissed today for having joined a strike yesterday to prevent a freeze on wages.

Aug. 9—Students clash with police in Montevideo. The students are protesting raids on university buildings.

Aug. 11—The Government closes the offices of the newspaper *El Diario* as part of a ban on information on student rioting.

Aug. 15—Thousands of Uruguayans march in honor of a youth slain in a recent student strike. A 24-hour general strike is held in sympathy with the students.

VATICAN, THE

(See also *Colombia*)

Aug. 6—At the Lambeth Conference in England (a meeting of bishops of the Anglican Communion held every 10 years), 463 attending bishops adopt a statement disagreeing with Pope Paul VI's prohibition against using mechanical or chemical birth control methods.

Aug. 11—Pope Paul VI, for the third time, publicly defends his encyclical, outlawing artificial methods of birth control, as revealing "true and superior morality."

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Aug. 11—Addressing a group in Saigon, President Nguyen Van Thieu declares that he is ashamed to have foreign troops fight in South Vietnam because there are South Vietnamese men who refuse to fight for their own country.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

Aug. 22—Following a meeting of the Presidium and the Executive Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists, a statement is issued denouncing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Aug. 24—President Tito meets with Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu at a Yugoslav town near the Rumanian frontier.

ZAMBIA

Aug. 14—President Kenneth Kaunda, in a broadcast, declares that he has outlawed the opposition United party. United party leader Nalumino Mundia has been arrested.

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